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
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
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MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA:
ANALYSIS OF THE 1965 CRISIS
IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

FRANK E. GALATI, JR., CPT, United States Army
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1972

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The general peace and relatively democratic governments that the Dominican Republic has experienced since the 1965 crisis illustrate the purpose of this study. Simply stated, that purpose is to show that, in spite of post-Vietnam trauma, a tightly controlled military intervention in Latin America can successfully end an armed insurrection with favorable political results. This success can be gained even if the decision to intervene was based on confusing and inaccurate field reports, as was the case in this crisis.

The essential conclusions drawn from this study are: (a) if the United States must intervene it must do so rapidly and massively with its Latin American allies in order to prevent any side in the conflict from gaining a quick military advantage; (b) Once in the country the U.S. must maintain as neutral a stance as possible; (c) Washington must absolutely keep its military means subordinated to a clearly stated, attainable, and negotiated political end; (d) rather than attempting to destroy the insurgent, intervening forces should isolate him on the ground and then include him in negotiations; (e) time must be allowed to work against the contending parties and in the favor of the intervening regional peacemakers.

The U.S. response to the Dominican crisis clearly shows that the often violent forces of change in Latin America can be controlled by intervention with the relative certainty of gaining a political solution acceptable, over time, to everyone. Whether or not the approach used to resolve the crisis can be used elsewhere in the region is debateable. However, in a rapidly deteriorating crisis, knowledge of how this success was achieved could help the policy maker or strategist in devising a rapid, decisive course of action, after other more peaceful efforts have failed.

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
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Name of candidate CPT Frank E. Galati, Jr., IN, United States Army

Title of thesis Military Intervention in Latin America: Analysis
of the 1965 Crisis in the Dominican Republic

Approved by:


LTC RICHARD F. WARD, M.A. - Inter. Rel. and Business Admin., Thesis Committee Chairman


LTC JAMES S. MATHISON, M.A. - Educ., Member, Graduate Faculty


MAJ JOHN T. FISHEL, Ph.D - Poli Science, Member, Consulting Faculty

Accepted this 30th day of May 1983 by Philip J. Brookes,
Director, Graduate Degree Programs.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA: ANALYSIS OF THE 1965 CRISIS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC by CPT Frank E. Galati, Jr., USA, 131 pages.

On the night of Wednesday, 28 April 1965, at approximately 1900 hours, the Sixth Marine expeditionary unit commenced operations in the Dominican Republic. For the first time since 1924 the United States Marines were back in that troubled nation. Before this confusing chapter in the history of United States and Latin American relations was over, an additional 22,000 U.S. paratroopers and Marines were committed to combat on that small island. This action ended the "Good Neighbor" policy of non-intervention in Latin America for the United States and established a precedent for intervening in the affairs of any Latin American country that threatens to become a "second Cuba".

The general peace and relatively democratic governments that the Dominican Republic has experienced since the 1965 crisis illustrate the purpose of this study. Simply stated, that purpose is to show that, in spite of post-Vietnam trauma, a tightly controlled military intervention in Latin America can successfully end an armed insurrection with favorable political results. This success can be gained even if the decision to intervene was based on confusing and inaccurate field reports; as was the case in this crisis.

The essential conclusions drawn from this study are: (a) if the United States must intervene it must do so rapidly and massively with its Latin American allies in order to prevent any side in the conflict from gaining a quick military advantage; (b) Once in the country the U.S. must maintain as neutral a stance as possible; (c) Washington must absolutely keep its military means subordinated to a clearly stated, attainable, and negotiated political end; (d) rather than attempting to destroy the insurgent, intervening forces should isolate him on the ground and then include him in negotiations; (e) time must be allowed to work against the contending parties and in the favor of the intervening regional peacemakers.

The U.S. response to the Dominican crisis clearly shows that the often violent forces of change in Latin America can be controlled by intervention with the relative certainty of gaining a political solution acceptable, over time, to everyone. Whether or not the approach used to resolve the crisis can be used elsewhere in the region is debatable. However, in a rapidly deteriorating crisis, knowledge of how this success was achieved could help the policy maker or strategist in devising a rapid, decisive course of action, after other more peaceful efforts have failed.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. The Purpose, the Problem and its Significance.

Military intervention in Latin America by the United States has often proven damaging to its interests in the region. Motivated by perceived threats to its national security, U.S. intervention has meant to the progressive Latin American nothing more than maintenance of the status quo; to the common man (or government regardless of its ideological leanings) the insult of yankee meddling. Yet, the U.S. as a major power can ill afford to renounce the use of force today as it did during the Castro-free period of the 1930's and 40's. This is because Cuban aid and example supported by Soviet generosity does pose a real threat to the region. But since the end of the Vietnam war the U.S. has questioned the utility of intervention anywhere in the world.

The purpose of this study was originally to determine if U.S. military intervention could be used effectively in Latin America to combat Cuban style revolutions. However, as the study progressed it became apparent that in a rapidly deteriorating political or military crisis what may appear to be a communist uprising may in fact be something entirely different. Hence the U.S. might not clearly know initially who or what it is fighting if the decision to intervene is made. Consequently, I intend to show that military intervention in Latin America can be successfully employed to combat a revolution in spite of the confused circumstances that might surround the decision to deploy U.S. troops. This is provided Washington maintains tight control of the intervening forces,

using them as a tool to help bring the opposing sides to the negotiating table.

2. The Method.

The method I will use to prove my hypothesis will be covered in greater detail in chapter 2. However, briefly stated it will be an historical analysis of the 1965 U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic.

3. Background.

Before discussing my hypothesis in any greater detail it is essential to review the problem's background to include the Regional Setting, U.S. interests, the threat to U.S. interests, and a discussion of the circumstances that would cause the U.S. to intervene.

A. The Regional Setting.

(1) Geography

In their book The Latin American Scene of the Seventies: A Basic Fact Book, Irving B. Reed, Jaime Suchlicki, and Dodd L. Harvey state, tongue in cheek, that Latin America cannot be thought of as that part of the Western Hemisphere physically dominated by the U.S. because it is too large. In reality the region is larger than the U.S. stretching some 7,000 miles from the Rio Grande in the North to Tierra Del Fuego in the South. From east to west it is 6,250 miles across and in total area it comprises 16 percent of the world's surface.¹ Its internal geography includes the Andes Mountains, the Amazon River and Jungle, the Pampas, the Isthmus of Panama and an 1800 mile border with the United States.

(2) The People

Linguistically (1977 figures), 182 million speak Span-

ish, 113 million speak Portuguese (Brazil) and 5 million speak French (Haiti).²

The total population is presently about 300 million. With an annual growth rate of approximately three percent (the world's highest) by the turn of the century the population should increase by an additional 300 million.³ Providing food, jobs, housing and social services for this exploding population is perhaps the greatest problem facing the governments of Latin America.

The impact of rapid population growth is especially acute in the cities. Rapid urbanization is either stretching housing, public health and sanitation to their limits or it is rendering them completely inadequate depending upon where you happen to be. The United Nations in the early 1970's estimated that 1.5 million dwellings were needed annually for thirty years in order to deal with anticipated population growth. When this basic cost is computed and the additional infrastructure costs of sewage systems, water supplies etc. are added to it the figure amounted to six billion dollars per year. In the case of several countries this figure would exceed their total national income.⁴

(3) The Social Structure

From its colonial period until the early decades of the twentieth century a well defined social structure existed in Latin America. On one end could be found a small, essentially landed aristocracy of European heritage. On the other end masses of basically illiterate peasants or laborers of Mestizo, Indian or Negro stock. An extremely small middle class of merchants could be identified; however, due to their size they had limited impact on the prevailing social system.⁵

Since World War II this picture has changed noticeably.

In many countries a second upper class consisting of self-made businessmen and politicians (sometimes one in the same) has grown to challenge the influence of the traditional elites. Concurrent with the rise of the businessman-politician has been the development of an urban working class; joining the rural peasant at the bottom of the social pyramid. However, unlike the traditional peasant, this "second" lower class is more vocal in expressing its demands and is politically active. Consequently labor unions have grown to become an important part of the new social and political order in Latin America.⁶

Perhaps the most significant recent development has been the rapid growth of a middle class in many Latin American nations. This new social group consisting of literate, urban white collar businessmen, government workers, and professionals is a visible indicator of the extent and direction of change in Latin America. This is important because a rising middle class has historically been associated with technological, economic and social modernization. This fact is substantiated because as a class they are growing most rapidly in those states considered the most developed in Latin America such as Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. As they grow in numbers their more nationalist and traditionalist values will greatly influence the future of their nations. This will happen to an increasing degree because as a class they have become a political counterweight used to counter excesses in either the upper or lower classes. Consequently, any governments seeking to remain in power by balancing support must recognize the goals and interests of this important group if it plans to remain in power for long.⁷

(4) The Economy

As a whole, Latin America can be considered an economically underdeveloped region. Most economies are dependent upon raw material or agricultural exports to pay for their imported foreign manufactured goods and technology.⁸ Briefly stated Latin Americans tend to be: "Capital importers rather than exporters...borrowers rather than creators of the technology they need to develop."⁹

Since the end of World War II there have been efforts to increase industrialization and reduce dependence on imported manufactured goods. However, an exploding population's needs for manufactured items as well as the basic needs of growing industry for imported machinery and energy have done much to limit success. Consequently industrial growth has been uneven with industry being concentrated in a few centers of growth. It is important to note that in spite of these efforts sixty percent of Latin America's working population is still engaged in some form of farming, much of it being subsistence.¹⁰ Because of these basic economic problems and an ever increasing population many Latin American governments have resorted to economic intervention to stabilize their economies. In the case of Brazil, Argentina and Peru the need to stabilize their economies became so urgent that it helped to trigger the return of strong military governments."

(5) The Political System

Latin Americans gained their independence from Europe largely during the early nineteenth century. Greatly influenced by the examples of the U.S. and France, they modeled their governments along the same liberal, republican lines. However it quickly became apparent that real power was not to be maintained by the government. It lay within the grasp of strong, well defined interest groups that were not neces-

sarily willing to share their prestige, influence and position with others. Consequently many governments were overthrown by armed bands led by "mestizo caudillos" in the employ of wealthy landowners. Competition between the landholders, the urban elites, independent caudillos and even the Catholic Church was the region's earliest form of post-colonial political rivalry. Yet, no one group was ever strong enough to gain and maintain the power needed to develop their nation.¹²

The late nineteenth century saw Latin American national political systems shift from the individual rivalries and anarchy of the early years to those characterized by coalitions of the different interest groups. Governments dominated by oligarcies and the dictators they sponsored became the rule in many nations. Unlike the past where power had been built on the mestizo and the church it now was based on alliances between the wealthy, the Army, the small urban middle class and growing British and American economic interests.¹³

By the mid-twentieth century factors such as nationalism, industrialization, a growing population and rising middle class caused the development of many new interest groups. New political parties and labor unions were formed, the church and guerrillas became more active and a plethora of ideologies arrived in time to be adopted by each competing group.¹⁴

With an increase in the number of interest groups came increased demands for more rapid national growth and development. Cries for faster industrialization, higher productivity and higher wages made the question of who controls the government critical. This is because Latin American governments have traditionally controlled their national economic and technical resource allocation systems. Therefore, whoever

controls the government, controls the means by which its group (or groups) can achieve its economic goals. Consequently, Latin American governments to this day rise or fall based upon their ability to achieve their national development goals. This is because failure to achieve their goals means failure to satisfy the needs of the interests groups and alliances that sustain them in power.¹⁵

(6) Conclusions on the Regional Setting

It is readily apparent (without trying to sound too simplistic) that Latin America, due to its varied geography, races and languages cannot in any way be described as homogenous. Its exploding population's demand for rapid modernization is not being uniformly satisfied by its underdeveloped economic capacity. (This problem is becoming particularly acute in the urban areas of the region). Consequently, political stability in the region continues to be threatened by the unsatisfied needs and shifting alliances of the many classes and interest groups that have historically provided the support that national governments need to remain in power. As we shall see later, the United States has historically viewed this problem as threatening to its national interests. The manner in which the U.S. dealt with it in the past has earned it a bad reputation that it must live with even today. The dilemma facing the U.S. now is how to continue protecting its national interests in the region knowing that the problem of political instability is just as great today as it was in the past.

B. U.S. Interests.

The interests of the United States in Latin America are indeed varied. However, they can be grouped under three major headings of Strategic, Economic and Political interests.

(1) Strategic Interests

From a strategic standpoint the United States has always sought to keep the nations on its southern borders at best friendly, at worst compliant. During its formative years the new republic most feared the possible expansion of European power in the hemisphere because of the potential threat this would pose to its national survival. The Monroe Doctrine was a recognized expression of this fear.¹⁶

As the United States grew in strength it never lost its fear of European power being lodged either on or close to its borders. The failure of several Caribbean nations to repay loans received from Europe at the turn of the century caused great concern in Washington because of the fear that the borrowers would be seized by the lending nations. The U.S. would not allow this to happen because of the perceived threat of a competitor on its doorstep. Perhaps even more pressing was the potential threat to its new canal being built across Panama. In response to this situation the U.S. declared (in the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine) that it alone would police this hemisphere for the world. Consequently the era of U.S. intervention in Latin American affairs was ushered in.¹⁷

Today the U.S. has the same kind of strategic concerns as in the past. A friendly, supportive, Latin America continues to be vital to U.S. strategy for hemispheric defense. This is because in time of conflict substantial U.S. forces would not have to be tied down in that region.¹⁸ Since the U.S. has become heavily dependent upon overseas trade for economic health and overseas alliances for national security, the nation's Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC's) have become its lifelines. At present SLOC's in the Caribbean basin provide transport for

60 percent of U.S. crude oil and 70 percent of its refined oil. Other Latin American regions have grown in strategic importance for the same reason. South Atlantic SLOC's carry half of U.S. oil imports, two thirds of Europe's and twenty to eighty-five percent of U.S. strategic materials imports coming from South Africa.¹⁹ Therefore, it is easily seen that any threat to these SLOC's can be construed as a threat to the U.S. and its allies.

(2) Economic Interests.

U.S. economic interests in Latin America have risen in importance in recent years. The region provides approximately 14 percent of U.S. imports and exports, 18 percent of U.S. private investments and is an important supplier of strategic raw materials such as bauxite, copper, platinum and tungsten. Mexico and Venezuela provide major secure sources of petroleum in the Caribbean Basin (as opposed to less secure sources in the Middle East). By 1985 the Latin American Regional Economy will be about the size Europe's was in 1970.²⁰ Consequently, the U.S. cannot allow this region of great economic potential to be denied to its businessmen.

(3) Political Interests.

U.S. political interests in Latin America overlap with its strategic concerns. The U.S. must have stable, friendly governments in the region. Political instability provides the conditions that can be easily exploited by those bent on isolating the U.S.²¹ Political instability and unfriendly governments in the region can also do much to diminish U.S. prestige and influence in world forums. This fact takes on particularly ominous proportions when one realizes that the twenty Latin American nations comprise one-sixth of the U.N. General Assembly.²²

At one time this sizeable voting block could be counted on to support the United States in the U.N. This can no longer be said today.

(4) Conclusions.

U.S. Strategic, Economic and Political interests in Latin America are far too great to afford this nation the luxury of viewing the region complacently. This fact becomes even more true than in the recent past because for the first time since World War II a very real threat exists.

C. The Threat.

Richard J. Barnet in his book "Intervention and Revolution, the United States in the Free World" pointed out that due to the basically conservative nature of the peasant "something extraordinary" must happen to him to cause him to risk his life rebelling against the economic, political and social conditions he has grown used to.²³

Except for a few slave revolts, riots, and impromptu rebellions with limited consequences, revolutions don't happen spontaneously. They are products of organization and elite direction and they must always require some sort of outside intervention.²⁴

This form of outside "intervention" has two aspects - one subtle, the other more direct. The later can feed on the former. Both are effective in arousing Latin American expectations and anger, thereby creating conditions threatening to U.S. interests in the region.

The first aspect is the Media. The late twentieth century explosion in communications had made even the most remote peasant aware of the gap that exists between his day to day reality and the reality of the outside world.²⁵ This creates expectations that his government for one reason or another cannot meet. Consequently, this also creates a desire for change.²⁶ Unfortunately for the U.S., because of our past

history in the region, we have become identified with those forces standing in the way of change. Although this is not the most favorable situation for the U.S. to be in, it is something it can learn to overcome with time; if it had the time. This leads to the second intervening aspect in the form of a Soviet backed Cuba.

The Cuban Revolution happened in-part because of the very conditions identified earlier as being characteristic of the problems in Latin America. However, as also stated, pre-conditions alone will not cause a revolution to happen. Ernesto Che' Guevera, one of the architects of the Cuban Revolution clearly understood this fact.

Revolutionary theory, as developed by Che based upon his experiences in the Cuban Revolution, recognizes the existence of two sets of conditions necessary for revolution. The first are referred to as Objective Conditions. Che defined them as those conditions relating to the people's exhaustion caused by repressive governments and economic exploitation.²⁷ Poverty, disease, ignorance and inequality are symptoms of this condition.

Che referred to the second set of conditions as subjective conditions. He defined them in a September 1963 article written for Cuba Socialista by quoting from the revolutionary document known as the Second Declaration of Havana. Specifically they are:

The factors of consciousness, organization and leadership that can accelerate or delay revolution depending on the state of their development.²⁸

In the same article Che went on to define 'consciousness' as the people's awareness of the need for change the certainty of it happening if everyone supports the revolution. Quoting again from the Second Declaration of Havana he clarified the relationship between the

subjective and objective conditions:

Sooner or later, in each epoch, as objective conditions ripen, consciousness is acquired, organization is achieved, leadership arises and revolution is produced.²⁹

Che believed that one of the greatest lessons the Cuban Revolution taught was that one need not wait for all the required objective and subjective conditions to evolve before a revolution can start. He believed, rather, that they can be created.³⁰ In Cuba: Historical Exception or Vanguard of the Anti-Colonial Revolution? (1961) Che narrowed the issue by indicating that the Objective Conditions already existed in Latin America and only the Subjective Conditions were missing.³¹ Therefore, Che believed a revolution can be started by either creating or hastening the creation of its Subjective Conditions. He believed that a small nucleus of indoctrinated fighters (the Insurreccional Foco) could create the subjective conditions of consciousness, organization and leadership needed to cause a popular uprising and defeat a regular Army.³² This is essentially what occurred in Cuba in 1959. The major impact of the Cuban Revolution on Latin America was the adoption and adaptation of Che's ideas.³³ Referring again to Che's words:

Given popular support and a good leader, the Cuban Revolution could be duplicated in other countries.³⁴

Cuba stands ready to fulfill her communist designated goal as a model for armed revolution in Latin America.³⁵

Consequently, after the fall of Batista, exiled leaders from all over the Caribbean were allowed to come to Cuba to learn from its example and to seek aid. Che organized several "Latin American Bureaus" to oversee efforts aimed specifically at Somoza in Nicaragua, Trujillo

in the Dominican Republic and Duvalier in Haiti.³⁶ The initial failure of these efforts, Cuba's expulsion from the Organization of American States, and the Bay of Pigs fiasco convinced its leadership that the United States would not allow their government to exist in its present form. They came to the conclusion that alignment with the Soviet Union and a more active insurgency campaign to neutralize U.S. influence was essential for their survival.³⁷

Therefore, U.S. interests face a strong challenge today in Latin America from a regionally isolated but Soviet supported Cuba, seeking to hurt the U.S. and spread its influence by exploiting the area's political, economic and social problems. The situation in Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador serves to demonstrate the seriousness of the threat. The problem facing the U.S. is how to respond to the threat. Its past history in the region would seem to dictate that it should tread lightly for fear of arousing a nationalistic backlash. Political, economic and some military assistance is being provided to several troubled Latin American governments, however, in a rapidly deteriorating situation that may be insufficient. Military intervention at this point becomes a serious option, perhaps the only option. The question then becomes is it justifiable.

D. When would U.S. Intervention be Justified?

William V. O'Brien in his book "U.S. Military Intervention: Law and Morality" defines intervention as the "extraordinary interference of one sovereign state in the internal or external affairs of another."³⁸ He goes on further to say that intervention is often difficult to defend because it destroys the existing structure of authority within a nation and generally breaks the normal pattern of relations be-

tween states.³⁹ The UN General Assembly carried this point one step further by passing Resolution 2131 in 1965, condemning armed intervention for all reasons.

Recognizing the importance of the non-intervention ideal in promoting harmonious international relations, the U.S. and other world powers also must be pragmatic. They understand that if they are to remain world powers they may have to intervene in key regions to protect their interests.⁴⁰

It is useless to outlaw intervention without providing a satisfactory substitute. When the apparent necessity of intervention appears to outweigh any long term advantages of preserving the principles of non-intervention, states will resort to the former.⁴¹

Therefore, the west has recognized four exceptions that will permit a just intervention they are:

1. Intervention by invitation.
2. Intervention to protect lives and property.
3. Humanitarian (to prevent genocide).
4. By Treaty Right.⁴²

The United States has also declared that it may act unilaterally to "impose order in any emergency situation when vital U.S. interests are at stake and no UN or treaty organization is prepared to act."⁴³ Obviously the U.S. cannot afford to leap into the fray every time an interest is threatened. Factors such as timing, public and congressional support and the willingness to expend resources comes into play also.⁴⁴ However, based upon our history of military action in the region, it is accurate to assume that the United States will feel justified to intervene anywhere in Latin America if the nation feels its security is threatened.⁴⁵ This could include threats to the Panama

Canal, our SLOC's, the U.S. mainland from Cuba and the outright invasion or external subversion (under the guise of a revolutionary war) of a Latin American ally. As President Kennedy stated in 1961:

I want it clearly understood that this government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are the security of our nation.⁴⁶

4. Thesis Statement

I intend to show, using the Dominican Crisis of 1965 as a case study, that in spite of confusion, misconceptions and poor public relations in the region, U.S. military intervention can be used successfully to combat a revolution and to achieve a constructive, lasting, political solution. This solution can be achieved provided Washington maintains tight control of the intervening force, using it as a tool to assist in bringing the opposing factions to the negotiating table. In order to accomplish this five principles must be recognized:

1. If the U.S. must intervene it must do so rapidly, and massively.
2. The U.S. must maintain a neutral stance and not act unilaterally.
3. Washington must keep its military means subordinated to a clearly stated, attainable and negotiated political end.
4. The insurgent should be isolated and not destroyed. Then later they are included in negotiations.
5. Time must then be allowed to work against the contending factions and in the favor of regional peacemakers.

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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to first review and discuss studies relevant to insurgency or internal war (revolutions, civil wars and guerrilla wars) and the general topic of counterinsurgency. A knowledge of literature on the subject of internal war is critical to understanding the forces at work in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the influence contemporary studies had on U.S. policymakers of the time. Next, using conclusions drawn from this review and discussion as a foundation, I will describe my method for analyzing a case study of the United States' 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic. Conclusions drawn from this study will then be used to support or refute my thesis statement in Chapter one. Finally I will explain why I selected the Dominican episode for study and briefly review some of the key literature used relating to the crisis.

1. Internal War and Counterinsurgency Studies

The study of internal wars or insurgencies is far from new. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the concept is as old as organized government and war itself. Luminaries such as Lenin and Mao in the early twentieth century as well as lesser lights such as Crane Brinton in his 1938 work Anatomy of Revolution analyzed the nature of internal war and the techniques used to prosecute them.¹

Interest in methods to control or eliminate internal war and maintain internal security, referred to under the general topic of

counterinsurgency, did not become fashionable in the United States until the 1960's. The post WW II rise of an unstable third world, fear of spreading Soviet power, and the realization that many U.S. national interests coincided with those of governments beset by communist insurgencies generated an increased awareness of the problem and a need to deal with it.² Subsequent U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia and Latin America and the theories of counterinsurgency it generated, were manifestations of this awareness.

The publication of Ernesto (Che) Guevara's book On Guerrilla Warfare in 1961, converted to revolutionary doctrine his experiences from the Cuban Revolution. This book served as a starting point for most counterinsurgency studies of the 1960's. Che's beliefs that an armed populace can defeat an army, a small band of guerrillas can create a revolution (by educating and arousing the populace) and the countryside is the home of the guerrilla provided an attractive model for revolutions in the third world at large and Latin America in particular.³ Consequently, it generated great interest in the U.S.

David Galula concluded in his book Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (published in 1964) that the basic mechanism to counter an insurgency is to build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward.⁴ This was an early recognition of the political nature of internal wars and the importance of winning the population over to the cause of the counterinsurgent. This premise has been repeated in one form or another since then by many writers on the subject.

Adrian H. Jones and Andrew R. Molnar in their 1966 historical analysis of insurgency entitled Internal Defense Against Insurgency: Six Cases found that one of the root problems of an unsuccessful counter-

insurgency effort is the failure of the counterinsurgent to take into account the political nature of internal war, choosing rather to look upon it as a problem of maintaining law and order. Additionally, they found in all cases where the insurgent failed, the critical factor working in the favor of the counterinsurgent was his ability to win public confidence.⁵

Lewis Gann stated in his book Guerrillas in History (1971) that armed action must correspond to political objectives for both the guerrilla and the counterinsurgent. He believed that once an area had been cleared of insurgents it is essential for the counterinsurgent to exploit his success by moving in quickly with civil administrators, food, resupply and reform. He also believed that destruction of the insurgents political organization was essential to the success of a counterinsurgency and that sound government helps to win mass support.⁶

Frank Kitson in Low Intensity Operations, published in 1971, criticized the military commander who failed to encourage his subordinates to submerge themselves in the atmosphere of the country they were fighting in. He believed that only by doing so will they be able to see things from the point of view of the population whose allegiance they are trying to regain and retain.⁷

N. K. Klonis, (a pseudonym) wrote in Guerrilla Warfare (1972) that a major prerequisite for successful Guerrilla War is the willingness of the people to support it both actively and passively. He also warned that although this may be the greatest strength of the guerrilla, it is also his great weakness.⁸

A Short History of Guerrilla Warfare written by John Ellis in 1976, looked back over two thousand years of internal war. Based upon

his review Ellis concluded that unless a guerrilla force directs all its efforts towards maintaining close links to the people, it can have little chance of victory. He reminds us that military considerations are always secondary to political, economic and social policies. Of the one hundred thirty wars he researched less than twenty were considered successful insurgencies and of them the issue was rarely decided by military confrontation.⁹

2. Competing Theories

Although most of the literature I reviewed was fairly consistent in designating the 'hearts and minds' of the people as the principal objective of the counterinsurgent there were a few dissenters; the most notable being Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr. Their February 1970 report, prepared for the Rand Corporation, entitled Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts looked upon an insurgency as a system requiring inputs of people, food, materiel and intelligence from both internal (Endogeny or the population) and external (Exogeny or support and sanctuary provided by a third party) sources. The system then converts the inputs, through training, logistics and operations functions into outputs which are troops, leaders and activities designed to attack the established authority. They argue that rather than trying to change the sympathies, attitudes and preferences of the people through the "hearts and mind approach" it is better to concentrate on controlling their outputs by making contrary behavior unprofitable. Essentially Leites and Wolf believe that the costs of concentrating on the hearts and minds of the population far outweigh the results and that resources could better be expended on trying to control the whole system.¹⁰

Douglas S. Blaufarb counters this argument in his book The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance: 1950 to the Present (1977) by stating that Wolf and Leites' approach, dismissing the effort to gain public support for defeating an insurgency as beside the point, is wrong. He effectively argues: how can a government or regime possessing a low level of confidence, kept that way by its dependency on the purchased loyalty of the military and police, ever hope to disrupt or destroy the insurgent system described by Wolf and Leites. His major premise is that competent and effective military operations are a product of a healthy political structure in which the army and police place themselves at the side of the people against a common enemy. Mere training and exhortation will not accomplish this. It is a structural effect reflecting the fact that the power base of a government is linked in some fashion to popular needs. Blaufarb concludes by saying in the long run military and police operations, while they can reduce and limit insurgent movement, they cannot be relied upon to eliminate it permanently. Only the government can do this by showing concern about popular needs and aspirations.¹¹

3. Conclusions Drawn from these Studies.

There are some general conclusions that I have drawn from my review of internal war and counterinsurgency literature: First, that relative military factors such as firepower, organization, mobility and command and control systems are critical if the counterinsurgent intends to halt an insurgency. Second, the role of third party nations or international organizations are essential for either negotiating a halt or prolonging the war through support of one side or the other. Finally, only the united action of an aroused populace can defeat an insurgency.

An internal war is political. Good government and effective propaganda is perhaps more important (in some respects) than an efficient military or police force. A nation might not lose to an insurgency because it has an effective military and police organization; but, unless it has a government responsive to the needs of its people, it can never hope to win.

4. Methodology.

Using these conclusions as a basis for analysis I intend to study the last major U.S. intervention in a Latin American internal war, the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic, to determine: why the United States succeeded in achieving its stated objectives there and how it minimized the traumatic effect that unilateral super-power intervention can bring about in the third world. From this analysis I will either support or refute my thesis.

My study will be conducted in three phases. The first phase, corresponding to Chapter three, will discuss the background conditions of the Dominican crisis and the crisis itself prior to U.S. intervention. The second phase (or Chapter four) will discuss the situation there the night before the decision to intervene was made, the actual U.S. intervention, and the role of the organization of American states. The third phase (found in Chapter five) will discuss the current situation in the Dominican Republic, analyze the crisis, concentrating on U.S. perceptions, the mission assigned to U.S. Forces, U.S. actions to control the rebels, and finally, the impact of third parties in the form of Cuba and the Organization of American States on the conflict. From this analysis I will draw conclusions about the success of the operation, the validity of my thesis, the potential for application of

lessons learned to any future crises in Latin America.

5. Why Study the 1965 Dominican Crisis?

a. Thoughts on the Subject

Jerome Slater, writing for the International Organization in 1964 observed that the Dominican Republic, like many other small Latin American countries, has had a long history of political instability. He concluded that since many of these same smaller states of Latin America share a similar language, customs, and temperament it is reasonable to conclude that a successful U.S. policy in the Dominican Republic could have further application in any Latin American nation possessing similar characteristics.¹² Slater could not have known that one year later U.S. troops would be enforcing some of the nation's Latin American policies in the Dominican Republic. However, I believe that his general observation is still basically valid.

The United States established a precedent as a result of the 1965 Intervention that made it clear it would intervene at its discretion whenever it believed that the threat of a communist takeover of a Latin American country exists. Despite the fact that the U.S. has always been sensitive about instability to its south (fearing the lodgment of a foreign power) this was the first time the U.S. intervened in the region with the primary objective of preventing the creation of a particular kind of government professing a specific type of ideology.

Although this concept has lain dormant for the past decade due to the effects of post Vietnam trauma on the body politic, the present administration appears to be taking a more forceful approach towards insurgency in the Caribbean Basin and Central America. U.S. involvement in El Salvador and Guatemala and its attempt to isolate

Nicaragua overtly and covertly are signs that the times are changing.

Consequently, I believe it would be wise for those in the military to investigate our more recent forays into Latin American internal dislocations, in order to re-learn old lessons (or even discover new ones) and then hold them at the ready in anticipation of future use.

b. Reasons for Selecting the Dominican Crisis of 1965.

As stated earlier, the Dominican Crisis was this nation's most recent intervention in Latin America. The mission of U.S. forces there to prevent a communist takeover and quickly terminate an internal war with minimal Latin American backlash was achieved. It was unique in that unlike past interventions it was not unilateral. The Organization of American States supported it not only diplomatically but also with troops. Although the post-intervention years have not been idyllic for the Dominican people they have achieved some political gains for example: for the first time in their history a democratic Leftist party candidate was elected president in 1978 and was not overthrown by the Right (although they planned to).

Therefore, the outward similarity of the Dominican Republic to other nations in the region, its potential for use as a model for future crisis resolution, the fact that the intervention is historically recent, and was successful were my reasons for selecting it as a subject for study. It is my hope that somewhere in the confusion that characterized the crisis there is a blueprint that could be used, if needed, in the future.

6. Literature Relevant to a Study of the Dominican Crisis.

Before launching into a detailed account and analysis of what happened during the Dominican Crisis it is necessary to briefly discuss

literature I found to be essential background reading. Although the books discussed don't address the question of how to control or eliminate an insurgency they are important if you want to understand the Dominican Crisis.

Dominican Crisis 1965, edited by Richard W. Mansbach (1971) gives a short but detailed account of what actually happened during the crisis without any attempt at editorialization. Mansbach distilled the facts from newspaper accounts and current histories to tell the reader specifically what happened, nothing more. This book provided me a baseline from which I could measure any distortion or misinterpretations of history as seen through the prejudiced eyes of politically biased authors.¹³

I found the Background Information Relating to the Dominican Crisis prepared by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (in July 1965) to be the best source of the official U.S. position in the crisis. By providing the full text of President Johnson and Adlai Stevenson's statements it made it possible for me to track the day-by-day shift of the official U.S. position from the initial humanitarian reason for the intervention to its actual purpose of preventing the establishment of a second Cuba in this hemisphere.¹⁴

Tad Szulc's book Dominican Diary written during the summer of 1965, (while the intervention was still going on) gave a critical newsman's daily eyewitness account of the Crisis from 24 April 1965 when the revolt started, to 27 May 1965 when Szulc returned to the U.S. Although taking the liberal's highly critical viewpoint of the U.S. diplomatic effort (he believed the U.S. bungled many key opportunities to negotiate a settlement soon after the invasion) his writing gave me a

a good flavor of the times and the event.¹⁵

The Dominican Crisis written by Piero Gleijeses in 1977 is a bitter, more radical account of the Dominican Crisis. The author believed that the U.S. action in the Dominican Republic was nothing more than a reassertion of a Pax Americana in the Caribbean. Gleijeses' major premise is that the U.S. in its attempts to assure its power in the region snuffed out the Dominican Republic's one chance at democracy in the form of democratic Leftist Juan Bosch's government. I found this book to be important because it gave me the rebel or 'constitutionalists' viewpoint in the crisis. At the time of its publication Antonio Guzman, a democratic Leftist, was elected President. Gleijeses added what might be construed as a 'sour grapes' postscript to the book recognizing Guzman's success but adding that the only reason Guzman was able to remain in office was because the U.S. restrained the Dominican right from acting against him.¹⁶ (Another case of Pax Americana?)

The final book I will review is Abraham F. Lowenthal's This Dominican Intervention. Written in 1972, based upon the author's eyewitness experiences while living in the Dominican Republic and one hundred fifty personal interviews, his analysis tears apart the official, radical and liberal accounts of the crisis to arrive at what he believes to be the actual reason why the U.S. acted in the manner it did. Considering the whole episode to be a tragedy, he concluded that the United States' high level leadership's view of reality in the Dominican Republic was diminished by predetermined attitudes and assumptions. Consequently, when lower level decision makers, arrive at making rational decisions based upon myopic guidance, mix with established procedures

to mold policy, a Dominican Intervention occurs.¹⁷

7. Listing of Selected Participants in the Dominican Crisis of 1965.

a. Balaguer, Joaquin: "Puppet" President under Trujillo and later his son Ramfis. Exiled January 62 - June 65. Elected President 1966 - 1973.

b. Benoit, Pedro Bartolome: Air Force colonel (Nineteenth of November base). President of the San Isidro-based Military Junta (28 April - 7 May 1965). Member of the Gobierno de Reconstruccion Nacional (GRN) (7 May - 30 August 1965).

c. Bennett, William, Tapley: U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic during the crisis.

d. Bosch, Juan: President of the Dominican Republic (27 February - 25 September 1963). President of the PRD.

e. De los Santos, Emilio: President of the First Triumvirate.

f. Garcia Godoy, Hector: Candidate for provisional president of the Dominican Republic (June - August 1965). Provisional president of the Republic (3 September 1965 - 1 July 1966).

g. Guzman Fernandez, Silvestre Antonio: A PRD leader. Considered for provisional president of the Republic (May 1965). Member of the Negotiating Committee of the Caamano government.

h. Imbert Barrera, Antonio: One of the two survivors of the inner core of the conspiracy that killed Trujillo. Member of the first and second Councils of State (1 - 16 January 1962 and 18 January 1962 - 27 February 1963). Army general. President of the GRN.

i. Jorge Blanco, Salvador: Attorney general of the Republic under the Caamano government; member of the Caamano government's Negotiating Committee.

j. Mann, Thomas: U.S. assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs from December 1963 until his appointment as undersecretary of state for economic affairs in March 1965.

k. Martin, John Bartlow: Former U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic under Kennedy. LBJ's special envoy during the crisis.

l. Molina Urena, Jose Rafael: President of the Chamber of Deputies during the Bosch government. A key civilian leader of the Enriquillo movement. Provisional president of the Republic (25-27 April 1965).

m. Palmer, Bruce: Lieutenant general, U.S. Army. Commander of the U.S. occupation forces in the Dominican Republic and vice-commander of the Inter-American Peace Force (May 1965 - January 1966).

n. Pena Gomez, Jose Francisco: A PRD leader. Head of the PRD in Santo Domingo during the civil war.

o. Postigo, Julio D.: Member of the GRN until his resignation on 10 August 1965.

p. Reid Cabral, Donald: Member of the second Council of State. President of the second Triumvirate (23 December 1963 - 25 April 1965).

q. Rivera Caminero, Francisco Javier: Admiral; navy chief of staff. Minister of armed forces of the GRN. Minister of armed forces of the Godoy government from 10 September 1965 until 6 January 1966.

r. Wessin y Wessin, Elias: General and director of the independent armed forces training center at San Isidro.

END NOTES

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
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CHAPTER 3

ONE NATION'S PLIGHT - THE SETTING FOR A CRISIS

On the evening of Wednesday, 28 April 1965, at approximately 1900 hours, Captain James Dare, Commander of Task Force 44.9 (whose ships had been lying in wait near Santo Domingo for several days) gave the order "Land the landing force." In response to that order elements of the Sixth Marine Expeditionary Unit commenced operations in Santo Domingo.¹ For the first time since 1924 the United States Marines were back in the Dominican Republic. Before this confusing chapter in the history of United States and Latin American relations was over an additional 22,000 U.S. soldiers and Marines will have been committed to combat on that troubled island. This action ended the "Good Neighbor" policy of non-intervention in Latin America for the United States and established a precedent for intervening in the affairs of any Latin American country that threatens to become a second Cuba. In order to understand the issues behind the 1965 Dominican crisis it is necessary to review the conditions that gave rise to it. An understanding of them will provide a basis for later discussions on the crisis itself and lessons that can be applied from it to the rest of Latin America.

Geographical Setting

The Dominican Republic comprises the eastern two-thirds of the Island of Hispaniola, the second largest island in the Caribbean, with Haiti occupying the remaining third of the Island. In total land area the Dominican Republic occupies 19,000 square miles. Its topography can

be characterized as rugged and mountainous. The western part of the nation is dominated by four parallel ranges arrayed in a general north-westerly direction. The eastern half has a single range extending in a general east to west alignment. Extensive valleys exist between the major ranges and a lowland plain covers a major part of the eastern end of the island. Numerous rivers and streams too shallow for navigation mark the overall landscape. The climate is tropical with prevailing temperatures, varying with elevation. Sea breezes tend to temper the tropical heat in the lowland areas. The rainfall pattern for the island is complex with precipitation generally heavier in the north and east than the south and west where mountains provide rain shadow. Two well defined rainy seasons exist however in much of the country with maximum precipitation occurring in the late spring and fall.² The Mona passage, which separates Hispaniola from Puerto Rico, and the Windward passage, which lies between Hispaniola and Cuba are the principle water routes linking Europe and North America with Central and South America.³ Possession of the Island of Hispaniola is important in controlling these two water routes.

Historical Conditions

The Colonial Period

Hispaniola was discovered by Columbus on his maiden voyage to this hemisphere in 1492. He found the island occupied by an indian tribe of suspected South American origin known as the Caribs. A colony was established along the northern coast, however its settlers were killed by the indians. On his second trip, Colombus established another colony in the same location but reports of gold being found to the south led to its abandonment and the subsequent founding of Santo Domingo in 1496.⁴

For a short period of time Santo Domingo flourished as the administrative capital of the Spanish Empire in the western hemisphere. The council of the Indies, created by Charles V in 1524 was the Spanish Crown's main agency there for directing colonial affairs. During most of its existence the council had absolute power in making laws, administering justice, controlling finance, trade, its armies and the church.⁵ The island possessed rich mines and fertile lands that proved inviting to fortune seeker and colonist alike. However, in their quest to exploit the riches of the island, the Spanish cruelly exterminated the native indian population through forced labor, disease and murder. Consequently, to fill the need of a new labor force, black slaves were imported to the island as early as 1503. By 1520, black labor was used almost exclusively.⁶

The discovery of vast riches in Mexico and Peru during the 1520's caused a mass exodus from Hispaniola to the Mainland. By 1550 the island had been all but abandoned. For the next two hundred fifty years Santo Domingo became a backwater raided by French, Dutch and English pirates and privateers.⁷ During this same time period a contest for control of the western third of the Island developed between Spain and France. The issue was finally settled in 1697 by the Treaty of Ryswick when Spain, hard pressed by wars in Europe ceded the western third of the Island to France. The exact boundary of the territory (Saint Dominique - Haiti) was not established at the time of the treaty and remained in question until 1929.⁸

By the later half of the eighteenth century (due to Spanish colonial trade reforms) Santo Domingo experienced a resurgent prosperity. By 1790 Santo Domingo's population had grown to 125,000 with a slave

labor force of 60,000. In spite of its economic growth Santo Domingo could not compete with its French neighbor on the Island. Saint Dominique possessed a slave labor force of 500,000 that intensively developed the colonies' resources and trade. This large number of slaves however was soon to be the undoing of the French Colony.

The Rise of Haiti

In 1791 Toussaint L' Ouverture a former Haitian slave, led a revolt of the colonies' slaves against their French masters. Although initially allied with Spanish forces in Santo Domingo he turned against them in 1794 when he found out that the French Revolutionary government had abolished slavery. By 1795 the combined French colonial and slave forces had defeated the Spanish forcing them to cede all of Santo Domingo to France.

In 1801, Toussaint marched on Santo Domingo, captured the governor and established a constitution for the island that freed all slaves. This action succeeded in frightening many of the islands' remaining Spanish citizens into immigrating to Venezuela, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. By 1802 Napoleon had tired of the activities on Haiti and dispatched a force that defeated Toussaint's troops, recaptured Santo Domingo and captured Toussaint. However, the French were ultimately defeated in 1803 by Toussaint's successor Jean Jacques Dessalines. On 7 January 1804 Dessalines declared independence for Saint Dominique which he renamed Haiti.⁹

Dominican Independence

Although the Haitians had succeeded in driving the French from Haiti they did not drive them from the island. The French retained control of Santo Domingo until 1809 when with the help of the British,

the remaining Spanish colonists revolted subsequently reinstalling Spanish rule. By 1821 a declining economy and general governmental incompetence (the *España Boba* Period) caused the colony of Santo Domingo to revolt again, this time against the Spanish.¹⁰ Under the leadership of Jose Nunez de Caceres the colonists declared independence and attempted to gain admittance to Simon Bolivar's Republic of Gran Columbia. Before this could happen Haitian forces, virtually unopposed by the new republic's alienated black and Mulattoe population, occupied Santo Domingo declaring it and the rest of the island subject to Haitian laws.¹¹

The Haitian Occupation

For the next twenty years under a policy that turned the island into a Black state, white emigration was encouraged. Haitians held the highest offices, closed the university, severed ties with Rome and generally tried to wipe out any trace of Spanish or western European influence.¹²

Prior to 1838 there was no organized attempt to oust the Haitians from Santo Domingo. In that year however a secret society dedicated to freeing Santo Domingo and organizing a liberal government was formed. This group, known as La Trinitaria, was led by a young student by the name of Juan Pablo Duarte. On February 27, 1844, fearing that their plot to overthrow the local Haitian government was about to be discovered, the group seized the Ozama Fortress in Santo Domingo. The surprised Haitian garrison offered little resistance and evacuated the city. In a few weeks the remaining cities of the former colony joined the provisional government and The Dominican Republic was finally born.¹³

The Dominican Republic: Initial Chaos

The new republic experienced problems right from the very begin-

ning, Duarte and the other leaders of the revolutionary movement were intent upon establishing an independent constitutional democracy. However, General Pedro Santana and the military faction he led, opposed an independent state on the grounds that a Haitian threat still existed. They believed the republic needed to be placed under the protection of a major power. The issue was resolved in September 1844 when Santana and his troops captured the capital and exiled Duarte and his followers.¹⁴

Concurrent with the rise of Santana was the emergence of Buenaventura Baez. For the next twenty years Santana and Baez would struggle for control of the Dominican Republic. Each would alternately rule the nation until Santana's death in 1864. During this same time period frequent Haitian incursions into the Dominican Republic kept alive the fear of eventual Haitian domination of the entire island. Santana requested that France or England annex the country; both nations refused. In 1855 he requested the United States assume the role of foreign protector. He was refused again. Finally in 1861 Spain agreed to annex its former colony. After several years of inept rule the Dominican Republic revolted again, driving the Spanish out in 1865.

The Dominican Republic: Later Chaos

Between 1865 and 1882 there were seven successful revolutions and sixteen chief executives. The two major rival parties were the Rojos (Reds) headed by Baez and the Azules (Blues) under General Gregorio Luperon. Differences between the major factions were few. Those in power, regardless of their background and support, devoted most of their time to securing loans to replenish the nation's treasury and pay off their supporters. One method used by Baez to secure funds was

placing portions of the Dominican Republic up for sale. Samana Bay, for example was offered to the United States in 1870.¹⁵ However, the aftermath of the civil war and Seward's purchase of Alaska dampened any enthusiasm Congress had for President Grant's proposal. Racial problems were perhaps the real underlying reason for the refusal. The United States government was having enough difficulty resettling southern Blacks without the addition of any from the Dominican Republic.¹⁶

The Roosevelt Corollary and the Dominican Republic

Ulises Heureaux became president in 1882. His domination of the Dominican Republic was to last until his assassination in 1899. Although his long tenure provided stability for the country his misrule was largely responsible for the nation accruing a large foreign debt. By 1905 the government of General Carlos F. Morales admitted that it was bankrupt. Germany, Britain, France and Spain threatened intervention to collect their claims. Enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine would have proven difficult for the United States under those conditions. Consequently President Theodore Roosevelt concluded that if the United States insisted that other nations recognize the Monroe Doctrine then the United States must assume responsibility for intervention on behalf of the aggrieved party or parties.¹⁷ Roosevelt told Congress:

The adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly in flagrant cases of...wrongdoing or impotence to the exercise of an international police power.¹⁸

This became known as the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

The U.S. and the Dominican Customs House

In January 1905 President Morales concluded a protocol with the United States allowing for civil intervention in the affairs of the Do-

minican Republic. The agreement also authorized the United States to take control of the Administration of the Dominican Customs House. This agreement pleased Europe and initially even Latin America. However, Latin American opinion soon changed to resentment when the protocol was used to justify military intervention.¹⁹ Unfortunately for Morales, because of this agreement, he was identified as being too pro-American and was ousted late in 1905.

The U.S. Occupation

From 1905 to 1911 the Dominican Republic was ruled by Ramon Caceres. During his administration most of the foreign debt was paid off, the economy prospered and even some civil liberties were respected. This was not to last very long because in 1911 Caceres was assassinated. Civil war then erupted again. In 1914 the United States attempted to resolve the problem by persuading the various factions to agree to a ceasefire and national elections. Juan Isidro Jimenez, the newly elected president, included prominent members of the various contending factions in his cabinet in an effort to reconcile their differences. This failed to achieve any success. Despite his refusal to accept a United States proposal to appoint a financial advisor and create a national constabulary, he was threatened with impeachment for being too compliant in his dealings with the United States. As the situation deteriorated the United States in May 1916 landed a force of 750 Marines to occupy key locations throughout the country. Jimenez resigned shortly afterward to be replaced by Francisco Henriquez y Carvajal. The new president also refused to accept the same offer from the United States that Jimenez had spurned earlier. Faced with the prospect of continued disagreement with the Dominican government and the certainty of continued chaos if the

United States withdrew the Marines, President Wilson responded by sending in more Marines and placing the administration of the Dominican government under the Navy Department.²⁰

During the eight years of occupation by the United States Marines roads, schools, sanitation and relative economic stability were established. Yet, the intervention was bitterly resented by the Dominican people. The Marines were finally removed in 1924 after the election of General Horacio Vasquez in March of the same year. However, control of the Customs House would remain under U.S. supervision until 1941.²¹

Trujillo

During the period of U.S. occupation the development of a military establishment was a priority project. Through the influence of an uncle, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo became a member of the newly formed National Guard in 1919. Within five years he had risen to second in command and by the time the Marines left had assumed full control.²²

It has since been alledged that Trujillo's rapid rise to power was insured by a series of mysterious accidents that occurred to his immediate superiors.²³ As more of Trujillo's life comes to light this point becomes more factual and less debateable.

In 1927, Trujillo became full advisor to President Vasquez. He converted the National Guard to a full fledged army with himself as commander in 1928 and created the Dominican Secret Police in the same year. In 1930, President Vasquez sought to extend his term of office illegally, thereby helping to precipitate not only a constitutional crisis but also another revolution. Forces under the leadership of Rafael Estrella Ureña, the political leader of Santiago, marched on Santo Domingo to oust Vasquez from power. Had Trujillo chosen to oppose Ureña his army

could have easily overcome the revolt. However, he chose to remain neutral apparently after having concluded a secret alliance with Ureña. Vasquez was then forced to resign and Ureña became the provisional president until elections later in the year determined who the new president would be. Trujillo then declared himself a candidate for the presidency and through skillful use of oratory and his secret police he was elected on 16 May 1930, unopposed.²³

Shortly after Trujillo's inauguration a hurricane destroyed a major part of Santo Domingo. Using this tragedy as a pretense for assuming dictatorial powers he established a rule by military decree that essentially was to last for the remaining thirty-one years of his life.²⁴

Soon after assuming the presidency Trujillo's opposition at all levels began to disappear. These mysterious disappearances have been attributed to Trujillo's use of a small, highly organized political terror force known as "La 42." This method for accomplishing his objectives was to become Trujillo's trademark. In fact the available evidence indicates that Trujillo's regime could be placed in the same category as Stalin's and Hitler's for ruthlessness. A tragic example of this occurred on the second and third of October 1937 when between 12,000 and 25,000 black Haitian sugar cane workers were killed by Dominican soldiers and farmers when it became apparent to the government that they were burdening the economy. There are estimates of perhaps one half million deaths attributed to the Trujillo regime's method of eliminating economic, social or political problems.²⁶

However, it must be said that the Trujillo regime was responsible for improvements in health, the economy, literacy and transportation.

Trujillo's policy of forced employment created economic growth and higher living standards for the people.²⁷ His accomplishments in the realm of economics rivals those of any Latin American government during the same time period. At the time of his inauguration the nation was bankrupt. Its foreign debt amounted to twenty million dollars while its income was only seven million dollars.²⁸ Trujillo's strong promotion of exports caused the balance of trade to shift in favor of the Dominican Republic in 1938 with approximately fifteen million dollars in exports against eleven million dollars in imports.²⁹ By 1947 his regime had liquidated all foreign debts.³⁰ In 1958 total exports equalled one hundred thirty seven million dollars as compared to one hundred thirty million dollars in imports.³¹

Under Trujillo per capita income increased to one hundred ninety dollars which was about the midpoint at the time when compared to other Latin American countries.³² The litany of achievements includes the development of an abundant water supply (one of the few in Latin America at the time), a highway network, public health services and a social security system. There was even some progress in the development of schools and universities.³³

A close examination of the achievements credited to Trujillo shows that the Dominican people never fully benefited from the wealth brought to the nation by him. In fact Trujillo and his family looted the country. At the end of his reign the Trujillo family controlled sixty percent of the nation's industries and fifty percent of its arable land. The family's exact wealth remains unknown but was estimated to be as high as one billion dollars at the time of Trujillo's death.³⁴ This remarkable accumulation of wealth can be attributed to not only Trujillo's

ruthlessness and business acumen but also his ability to keep the masses productive. Propaganda exhorted the people to work harder for a better standard of living in order to raise their expectations. Then, sufficient quantities of the national wealth were allowed to trickle down to the masses to pacify them and demonstrate what potential the future held if they continued along the route mapped by the Trujillos.³⁵ Therefore, with public opinion controlled by his propaganda machine and all opposition neutralized by his secret police Trujillo was able to turn the Dominican Republic into a prosperous family business.

In order to maintain the appearance of a democracy, Trujillo allowed regular elections. During the mid 1930's he arranged for Jacinto Pagnado and later Manuel de Jesus Trancoso de la Concha to be elected President. However, in 1942 and for the next ten years Trujillo again assumed the presidency. In 1952 his brother Jose became the President and was re-elected in 1957 with Joaquin Balaguer as his Vice President.

As a result of his ruthless reign many attempts were made to oust Trujillo. In 1947 a naval invasion launched from Cuba was attempted but was aborted before it ever left Cuban waters. Later in that same year a revolt, supported by Guatemalan President Juan Arevalo was suppressed by Trujillo. In 1950, an attempt to assassinate Trujillo failed and on 14 June 1959 an invasion supported by both Fidel Castro of Cuba and Romulo Betancourt, President of Venezuela, was smashed by the Dominican Armed Forces.³⁶

World opinion was now turning against Trujillo. Even the United States began to take a dim view of the Trujillo regime in spite of its anti-communist leaning. In 1960, Trujillo's agents were suspected of

attempting to assassinate President Betancourt. Consequently the Organization of American States (to include the United States) unanimously found Trujillo in violation of the OAS charter.³⁷ Sanctions under Articles Six and Eight of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) were approved, trade was suspended and diplomatic relations severed.³⁸ At this point even the Catholic Church openly opposed Trujillo (Trujillo had divorced his wife and taken a mistress).³⁹

On 2 January 1961 another attempt on Trujillo's life failed but finally on 30 May 1961 he was killed by a group of high government conspirators. From this group only two were to escape; Antonio Imbert Barrera (the ex-governor of the Republic's Puerto Plata Province who would figure prominently in the 1965 crisis) and Luis Amiano Tio.⁴⁰

The Pre-Bosch Period, 1961-1962

The news of Trujillo's assassination was met by mixed emotions in the United States. There was however some fear that the long suppressed Dominican people might revolt leading to the possibility of another "Cuba". Senator Smathers, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Latin American Trade, was so deeply concerned about this situation he proposed that the Marines be dispatched to prevent a "Bloody Civil War and a communist takeover of the country by the Castro brothers."⁴¹

Although intervention was deemed unnecessary, a period of unrest and political upheaval followed.⁴² The death of Trujillo ended the longest period of stability a Dominican government has ever known. Although economic growth during the period had been significant, social and political development lagged. The elimination of all healthy political activity, coupled with the absolute control of the Dominican people created a political vacuum that was not to be easily filled.⁴³

In fact, the Dominican Republic suffered through four coups and five changes of administration between 1961 and 1965 as it sought to find a way to fill this vacuum.⁴⁴

During Trujillo's last years, Joaquin Balaguer sat as the figurehead President of the Dominican Republic. After Trujillo's death he remained in office courting popular support by reducing the price of basic goods, increasing freedom of expression, allowing the formation of opposition parties and permitting exiled leaders to return.⁴⁵ Trujillo's son Rafael, known as "Ramfis", was appointed Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces, in effect succeeding his father as ruler of the Dominican Republic. The rest of the Trujillo family including Trujillo's two brothers Hector and Arismendi, who both opposed Balaguer's reforms, continued to enjoy their special privileges and influence. Consequently, despite his attempts to please them, the Dominican populace viewed Balaguer suspiciously.⁴⁶ In addition to these internal problems the Organization of American States refused to lift the 1960 sanction imposed against the Trujillo regime. These steadily mounting pressures virtually paralyzed the country.⁴⁷

Pressed into taking action against the remainder of the Trujillo family by the United States Ambassador and the Organization of American States, Balaguer exiled Hector and Arismendi Trujillo in October 1961.⁴⁸ An impending Coup led by the two Trujillo brothers came to light later, in November 1961. The United States countered this move against Balaguer by positioning a Naval Task Force offshore and threatening intervention if the coup succeeded.⁴⁹ This show of force and the support of General Rodriguez Echevarria, Commander of the Air Force at San Isidro Air Base, as well as other lower ranking officers preserved Balaguer in

power, forcing all the Trujillo's into exile.⁵⁰

In spite of United States support and his efforts to appease the Dominican people, Balaguer was never successful in winning support for his government. Finally on 1 January 1962, after a night of rioting, Balaguer resigned his office surrendering power to a Council of State Government (which had been developed as a compromise between the various opposing factions),⁵¹ Consequently, the Organization of American States lifted its sanctions and the United States provided its support to the new government.

The Council had been in operation less than a month when General Rodriguez Echevaria, one of its more prominent members, took over the government.⁵² The Echevarria rule lasted two days, ending as a result of a counter-coup. He was replaced by a new Council of State consisting of prominent Dominican business and professional men headed by Rafael Bonnelly. The Bonnelly government made some progress during its tenure after receiving substantial economic assistance from the United States Alliance for Progress Program.⁵³ Perhaps the most important accomplishment of the Bonnelly government was its preparation of the Dominican people for national elections in December 1962. It was during the general elections that Juan Bosch, candidate of the Dominican Revolutionary Party. (PRD), became the first freely elected president since 1924.

Juan Bosch

Juan Bosch gained the Presidency of the Dominican Republic with fifty-nine percent of the popular vote and a more than two-to-one majority over the only other major candidate.⁵⁴ Although opposed by the Church and various rightist groups (two of the traditional pillars of

Latin American Society) he was strongly supported by the rural peasant classes and city labor. Elected on a platform of sweeping reforms, economic development, improved education, social benefits for all and restoration of freedom and civil liberties, Bosch realized that his objectives could not be implemented at once. However, he was determined to try.⁵⁵

Juan Bosch possessed many admirable qualities. He was an idealist who had spent the last twenty-four years of his life in exile because he opposed Trujillo. He believed that honesty and integrity in government were critical to the success of any administration. He was also a fine speaker, writer and poet. Unfortunately he proved to be a less than competent administrator.⁵⁶ His lack of administrative experience and political expertise were the primary causes of the indecisiveness that characterized his government. In addition Bosch refused to delegate authority, became preoccupied with minor details and rewarded his peasant supporters with government positions they were ill equipped to handle. Corruption and incompetence therefore soon became common in his administration.⁵⁷

In February 1963 Bosch embarked on a dual track program of economic development (calling for austerity) at home concurrent with grants and loans from abroad.⁵⁸ In order to lay the groundwork for this program, even before his inauguration, president-elect Bosch visited the United States and Europe seeking assistance. In the process of doing this he succeeded in annoying the United States by proclaiming that he had received pledges from France, Great Britain and West Germany amounting to three times the sum promised by the United States. In addition he voided the contract between the Standard Oil Company of New

Jersey and the former Council of State declaring it harmful to Dominican interests; therefore, requiring renegotiation.⁵⁹

In spite of Bosch's rhetoric he had the full support of the United States to establish a democracy in the Dominican Republic. In giving this support the United States hoped to achieve two objectives: The first, being the maintenance of political order in the nation, and the second was the development of a non-communist government. Unfortunately the Bosch attempt to establish a democratic government without establishing political order first ended in failure.⁶⁰ United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic during the Bosch Administration John B. Martin stated that:

Hopes were high that he (Bosch) would build a democratic society in the Dominican Republic on the ruins of tyranny. As the ambassador I did everything in my power to help him give the ordinary Dominican people freedom and a better way of life. But Bosch had few experienced people to help him and his ineffective government disappointed his party and the people.⁶¹

Perhaps Bosch's greatest shortcoming (other than his lack of administrative skill), was, strangely enough, his high sense of personal integrity and idealism. He wanted his government to be so perfectly democratic that he overlooked the frightful lack of political maturity in his people. Although never accused of being a communist he tolerated the rapid expansion and entrenchment of various native communist factions in his government. He chose not to interfere with their activities because he desired to adhere to his democratic principles.⁶² Bosch's radical public declarations caused great concern among the rich, the military, and the church. Yet, he continuously solicited their support.⁶³ Dominican labor leaders became dissatisfied with Bosch after he proposed to combine the nations' unions into a single labor alliance. Even the

farmers and agricultural workers became angry with him because the land reforms he had promised during the election never occurred.⁶⁴ In addition, Bosch's zeal to grant wage increases to sugar workers raised sugar production costs from the strong 1960 level of three and one half cents per pound to approximately seven cents per pound, thereby pricing Dominican sugar out of a world market where sugar could be obtained for four and one half cents per pound.⁶⁵ Considering that the Dominican Republic essentially sustained its rapidly growing population on its income from sugar exports it is quite easy to see the terrible consequences of this naive act.

To complicate matters even more, Juan Bosch, in July 1963, seemingly not satisfied with only angering the Church, the rich, labor, the military and threatening the economy, decided to also challenge Haiti over a recent border incident. Fortunately the Organization of American States offered its good offices to resolve the issue otherwise there may have been a war.⁶⁶

Opposition to Bosch consequently began to grow. Yet, instead of seeking conciliation he responded with more strident attacks upon the rich, the church and military.⁶⁷ In response to the Haitian crisis he secured the enactment of a new constitution which guaranteed his government a freer hand in dealing with the nation's economic and social order.⁶⁸ This action further frightened the business, landowning and clerical pillars of Dominican Society. However, it was Bosch's refusal to curtail the liberties of the nation's various communist factions and the permission he gave those in exile to return to the Dominican Republic that finally unified opposition to his government.⁶⁹

On 20 September 1963, following a call by right wing political

parties for a general strike, thousands of shops throughout the Dominican Republic closed in protest against the government.⁷⁰ On 25 September 1963, Juan Bosch was removed from the presidency, seven months after his inauguration, by means of a bloodless military coup.⁷¹ The coup was led by the Armed Forces Minister, Major General Victor Elby Vinas Roman and Generals Antonio Imbert Barrera and Luis Amiano Tio, both of whom had served on the former ruling Council of State.⁷² Proclaiming that "Castro Communism had been crushed" the coup leaders declared they were forming a "rightest state" because of Bosch's "negativism before reiterated demands by the army to curb communism" and to correct the "chaotic situation" caused by unemployment and governmental incompetency.⁷³

Naive to the very end, Bosch was to write that the actual reason he was overthrown was because he refused to authorize a six million dollar purchase of British Hawker jet aircraft for the Air Force. Bosch contended that he wanted to stop the fifteen to twenty percent commissions that the military had been receiving as a matter of course with each new equipment purchase.⁷⁴ On 1 October 1963 Bosch was again exiled from the Dominican Republic. Arriving in Puerto Rico (on the same day) he was met at the airport by Puerto Rican Governor Luis Munoz Marin. In his greeting to Bosch, Marin declared "I think a very hard line of nonrecognition should be taken by the United States and every other democratic country."⁷⁵ Shortly thereafter, (on 4 October) the Kennedy Administration ordered the withdrawal of all U.S. economic and military aid personnel from the Dominican Republic thereby halting the U.S. Alliance for Progress program in the nation.⁷⁶

The Post Bosch Period. 1 October 1963 - 24 April 1965

The day following the ouster of Juan Bosch, the coup leaders turned their authority over to a three man civilian junta commonly referred to as the Triumvirate. The Triumvirate was headed by the former president of the electoral college which had elected Juan Bosch eight months earlier, Emilio de Los Santos. He was joined by Manuel Enrique Tavares Expailat, an industrialist and Ramon Tapia Espinal a lawyer and former member of the Council of States. A New York Times article appearing on 27 September, however indicated that the Triumvirate was in reality a front for Gen Imbert Barrera, the virtual warlord in charge of the nations heavily armed twelve thousand man police force.⁷⁶

Opposition reaction to the Triumvirate was swift in coming. On 7 October 1963 a state of siege was declared in Santo Domingo when two thousand students attempted to march on the National Palace. The students sought a return to the July 1963 constitution created by Bosch (during that summer's crisis with Haiti) and suspended by the coup leaders on 25 September. In addition they demanded the reestablishment of the legislature which had also been eliminated by the coup leaders in September. Unfortunately for them they were violently dispersed by the police after having succeeded in only occupying several buildings on the university campus.⁷⁷

On the same day as the student march, the Dominican Congress met secretly to adopt a declaration demanding an immediate return to constitutional rule. On 11 October they met secretly again to elect former senate President Juan Casanovas Garrido as the provisional Chief of State. Garrido was arrested three weeks later and exiled to Puerto Rico.

The Trimvirate attempted to defuse the situation by announcing

(on 12 October 1963) that they had devised a plan to return the Dominican Republic to constitutional rule in the summer of 1965. The plan called for first electing representatives to attend a constitutional convention in September 1964. Next, municipal and congressional elections would occur three months after the end of the convention (perhaps in January 1965) to be followed by presidential elections in June or July 1965.⁷⁸ By 31 October President Kennedy became convinced that the Triumvirate was determined to return the Dominican Republic to constitutional rule. Consequently, after talks with the new Johnson Administration, the Dominican government was recognized by the U.S. on 14 December 1963.

One week later, the leader of the leftist 14th of June Movement, Manuel Tavarez Justo and fifteen other pro-Castro rebels, were killed by government forces. A 25 December New York Times article stated:

The Military insisted that a show of force was necessary to prevent the spread of guerrilla activity as well as to justify the overthrow of Bosch.⁷⁹

In protest to the Military's somewhat brutal repression De los Santo resigned as president of the Junta on 22 December 1963. He was replaced by Foreign Minister Donald J. Reid Cabral on 23 December 1963.

Donald Reid Cabral's elevation to the Presidency apparently occurred because as Foreign Minister he had been instrumental in getting the Johnson Administration to restore diplomatic relations and economic aid to the Dominican Republic. Subsequently his relationship with the United States became so close that he allegedly earned the leftist sobriquet of 'el americano'.⁸⁰

The Triumvirate, now with Donald Reid Cabral in charge, tried to move on with a program of economic, political and social reform. Un-

fortunately the problems it had to face were of much a magnitude that it is questionable that any one leader or group of leaders (perhaps with the exception of a Trujillo) could have overcome the chaotic situation and succeeded.

The primary problem facing the government was the economy. The principle pillars upon which the Dominican economy rested (and still rests) were the export crops of sugar, cocoa, and coffee. The world market prices for them had been dropping steadily reaching their lowest points during Reid's administration. Consequently the nation entered an economic depression with its commercial balance reaching its lowest point in forty years by December 1964.⁸¹ With the government on the verge of bankruptcy there was little it could do to ease the pain for the nation's unemployed. In fact it could not even pay for the services of the public agencies, schools and hospitals which the people had over the years come to depend upon.⁸²

Reid's economic recovery plan called for implementing an austerity program that would limit imports thereby eventually restoring the nation's balance of trade.⁸³ In addition he received major loans from the U.S. and credits from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to keep the nation solvent. Although his plan was basically sound in principle and was supported by the U.S. and the IMF, it was not supported by the Dominican people because they failed to understand it. Economists and businessmen thought it would both hurt small businesses and make the nation too dependent on the United States. Labor leaders believed it would increase unemployment and the military did not relish the thought of reduced budgets. Consequently, attacks on the Triumvirate mounted with time.

On 3 May 1964 a series of leftist instigated taxi and bus strikes (begun in several provincial cities) spread into Santo Domingo and rapidly assumed the form of anti-government demonstrations. As many as four thousand drivers and dockworkers struck in sympathy with the demonstrators.⁸⁴ On 11 June 1964 at least ten persons were killed and one hundred ten wounded in a series of ammunition dump explosions that occurred at a military installation outside Santo Domingo. Reid branded the incident as sabotage and announced two days later the arrest of fourteen people said to be connected with the attack.⁸⁵ In March 1965 leftist agitators scored another propaganda victory when government troops and a squadron of P-51 fighter planes were needed to quell labor disturbances at the U.S. owned La Romana Sugar Complex.⁸⁶ In time (although divided into three major factions) the different leftist movements realized that their common political interests called for the toppling of the Triumvirate, the reestablishment of the constitution and the return of Juan Bosch to power.⁸⁷

The extreme left however was not the only sector to attack and attempt to undermine the Triumvirate. Many of the principal leaders of the 1963 anti-Bosch movement including Rafael Bonnelly and Luis Amiana Tio maintained a continuous verbal barrage against the Triumvirate primarily because they had been excluded from its inner circles of power by Reid.⁸⁸ Juan Bosch and Joaquin Balaguer both from exile tried to sway the populace to their side. Ironically their opposition to Reid and the Triumvirate brought them together in their efforts to diminish the government.⁸⁹

In an effort to improve its image the Triumvirate announced, on 7 September 1964, that congressional and municipal elections would be

scheduled for 1 September 1965. Reid also authorized amnesty for forty-seven prisoners seized in December 1963 during the 14th of June Movement's uprising in the northern mountains (near Santiago de los Caballeros).⁹⁰ Unfortunately for Reid and the Triumvirate the forces of rebellion they set into motion early in their regime, would not be delayed.

It is ironic that the success Reid had achieved in attacking corruption in the military was to prove to be his eventual undoing. In February 1965, after sacking several powerful military figures including the Chiefs of the Air Force, Navy, Army and Police, Reid fired the Secretary of State for the Armed Forces and assumed the position himself.⁹¹ Although this action increased his control it also seriously isolated him from the military. Perhaps even more serious was his choice to alienate Army General Elias Wessin y Wessin, Commander of the autonomous Armed Forces Training Center, whose support had proven critical to the installation of the Triumvirate after Bosch had been ousted. Consequently, when the rebellion began in April no one within the military establishment would defend the regime.⁹²

As early as 6 October 1963 (eleven days after his ouster) Juan Bosch predicted that he would return to the Dominican Republic in not more than ninety days because he believed the Triumvirate could not "afford more than ninety days of the present economic situation."⁹³ Although far from accurate in predicting the counter coup's date, Bosch was accurate in his belief that the regime would not last. Consequently, he worked very hard towards achieving its end.

Bosch had learned his lesson well from the 25 September 1963 coup that ousted him. He understood that if he was to be successful

in reversing the coup he would have to manipulate the very same elements that were instrumental in removing him from power, namely, the Dominican Armed Forces. Therefore, Bosch began in 1964 to lay the foundations within the Armed Forces for his return.⁹⁴

Working through Colonel Fernandez Dominguez, the Dominican Attache to Madrid (before being discovered and exiled to Puerto Rico) and Lieutenant Colonel Angel Hernando Ramirez (a close friend of Fernandez), Bosch was able to stimulate plots and, perhaps of even greater importance, to organize cadres of officers loyal to him. In January 1965 a Bosch plot to overthrow Reid, although planned several months earlier, was not allowed to be carried through probably because it may have been partially discovered. Throughout the months of February, March and even early April the conspirators apparently came close to launching their coup attempt. However, for one reason or another they never seemed to be able to complete their preparations. Therefore, a final date for the coup was never firmly established.⁹⁶

President Reid Cabral had however received warnings from his agents of an impending coup attempt in April 1965. This seems rather remarkable due to the fact that there were so many different factions planning coups (in addition to Bosch's key supporters) that it was difficult to perceive accurately what actually was going on. Apparently by 22 April 1965 Reid had learned about the secret pro-Bosch military conspiracy. On that date he fired seven junior Air Force officers all of whom had connections with the pro-Bosch Cadre. Reid had also personally questioned Lieutenant Colonel Hernando Ramirez that same week about what he was planning. Sufficiently frightened by these actions Hernando and the other conspirators decided to set the date of the coup

for 26 April.⁹⁷

Acting on newly acquired information, General Marcos A. Rivera Cuesta, the Army Chief of Staff, told Reid on Saturday morning, 24 April 1965, that Lieutenant Colonels Hernando Ramirez and Alvarez Holguin were in fact conspiring against him. Reid immediately ordered that their commissions (in addition to those of several other officers) be cancelled. Later that day Rivera Cuesta personally confronted the conspirators and attempted to carry out Reid's orders. However, rather than surrendering to Rivera Cuesta the conspirators chose to arrest him instead. Within minutes of Rivera Cuesta's arrest Francisco Peña Gomez (a local leader of Bosch's PRD), who had been preparing for his daily broadcast on Radio Commercial in Santo Domingo, was informed by the rebels of what had happened. Dramatically he announced to the city that Reid Cabral's government had fallen and that the return to "constitutionality" had begun. Peña Gomez's announcement signaled the beginning of that confusing and tragic series of events which has become known today as the Dominican Crisis of 1965.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ZONE

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CHAPTER 4

THE DOMINICAN CRISIS

Prelude to Intervention

Responding to Peña Gomez's announcement, Radio Santo Domingo (the government radio station) announced that the reports of Reid's ouster were quite false and that he was still in control of the government. Pena Gomez and several other PRD members countered later by actually seizing Radio Santo Domingo and then repeating their initial announcements. As word spread of the "revolt", demonstrations broke out in different parts of the country. Yet, by the time government riot police had recaptured the radio station, dispersed some of the demonstrators, and imposed a curfew it began to outwardly appear that Reid actually did have the situation in hand. This was duly reported to Washington by the U.S. Embassy.¹ However, the Embassy's ability to determine what really was going on in Santo Domingo was constrained by the absence or inexperience of certain key members of its staff. The Ambassador, W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. was in the United States, the Charge' d Affaires William B. Connett, Jr. was new, the Central Intelligence Agency Station Chief had just returned from an extended absence, other members of the CIA contingent were away and most of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) were in Panama.² In fact, the United States was not expecting trouble quite this early. U.S. officials had thought that if any problems were to come they would occur in June during the time that active campaigning began for the September elections.

Furthermore, Reid had reassured Ambassador Bennett that no revolts would occur. He made this pronouncement in response to reports Bennett sent to Washington on 12 and 16 April, that plots were forming in Santo Domingo.³ Consequently the U.S. State Department was not aware of the precarious situation in Santo Domingo by the evening of the 24th of April.

In reality, Reid Cabral was fighting for his life. By now two-thirds of the military units near Santo Domingo were in revolt. Supported by groups of ex-officers (some fired by Reid Cabral), the rebel soldiers were threatening to enter the downtown area of Santo Domingo. Reid Cabral requested that General Wessin y Wessin defend the city from the potential rebel attack. The General chose not to respond.⁴ General Antonio Imbert Barrera, the virtual ruler of the nation's police force, offered to mend the split in the military and put down the revolt if in exchange he was made Secretary of State for the Armed Forces. Reid Cabral refused his request. Subsequently, when Imbert realized how serious the situation was, he offered to support a rebel coup provided he was made leader of a new junta that would hold elections later in the year. The rebel leadership also spurned him, stating that they only intended to restore Juan Bosch's presidency.⁵

By the morning of 25 April 1965, Reid Cabral was still hopelessly searching for someone to defend his government. The Air Force Chief, General De Los Santos, a supporter of Juan Balaguer, refused to help him. He again turned to Wessin y Wessin who again refused to help by reportedly stating that "he could not use his tanks without air support."⁶ Rejected by his military, Reid Cabral finally inquired of the U.S. Naval Attache if the United States would intervene in his behalf.⁷

Faced with this difficult request the new U.S. Embassy Charge' d Affaires Connett turned to the State Department for guidance. Discussing the situation with Caribbean Country Director Kennedy M. Crockett, Connett was told to meet with Reid Cabral and explain that there was little the U.S. could do. They both agreed that further support of Reid Cabral and the Triumvirate was useless. They finally decided that a better position for the United States to take would be to support the creation of a new provisional military junta already being created by a member of Reid Cabral's cabinet, General Montas Guerrero. In this way they hoped to avoid bloodshed by insuring that a stable government, dedicated to elections, was created to temporarily rule the Dominican Republic.⁸

Connett was also instructed not to become involved in any scheme which might involve the transfer of power to Bosch and the PRD. Such a solution was considered in Washington to be impermanent and in addition there was growing concern about reports of extreme leftist and Communist participation in the PRD. He was finally instructed to keep close watch on the situation to insure that American lives were not placed in jeopardy by any sudden change in the temperament of the various parties involved.⁹

Reid Cabral was not enthusiastic about the plan to turn power over to General Montas Guerrero. Consequently he was hesitant towards being rushed into any quick solution, choosing instead to continue his vain search for a champion. The Military Chiefs, although divided politically, were united in their opposition towards Reid Cabral. Therefore they chose to sit back and allow the situation to further develop.

The supporters of Juan Bosch however were extremely active. On

the morning of 25 April they seized the Government Radio Station, again. Declaring that Reid Cabral had been ousted, they requested that the people join their efforts. Responding to the rebel's call for help the people of Santo Domingo gathered by the thousands at the National Palace and along the Duarte Brigade (to block the possible movement of troops from the San Isidro Air Base) shouting for the return of Juan Bosch. Within minutes of the radio announcements a delegation of Pro-Bosch officers headed by Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Caamaño Deno arrived at the National Palace and arrested Reid Cabral. By noon radio Santo Domingo declared that Dr. Jose Rafael Molina Urena, the former President of the Dominican Chamber of Deputies under Juan Bosch, was to be installed as provisional President of the "new constitutionalist government." He was to remain President until the arrival of Juan Bosch from exile.¹⁰

When it became clear that Molina Urena was taking power in the name of Juan Bosch the anti-Bosch members of the military finally acted. Generals Wessin-y-Wessin and De Los Santos, both major participants in the 1963 anti-Bosch coup, demanded that Molina Urena support a provisional junta. Negotiations were held with the rebels in an attempt to persuade them to participate in that junta. The rebels however would not be persuaded. Realizing that the negotiations were stalemated and fearing that the formal installation of Molina Urena as temporary president was eminent, Wessin-y-Wessin ordered his forces to attack Santo Domingo. Responding to his orders, four P-51 fighter planes, belonging to the Dominican Air Force, strafed and bombed the National Palace and rebel positions in the city late in the day on 25 April.

By attacking the rebels, Wessin-y-Wessin had changed the charac-

ter of the crisis from merely a dispute among factions in the military to a civil war. The pro-Bosch rebels, rather than giving in to the military's demand for a junta, answered the air attacks with urgent appeals on the radio for the Dominican people to attack the homes of air force officers. In addition, weapons were distributed among the people from military arsenals under the pro-Bosch forces control. Battle lines were now drawn and the fight for Santo Domingo began.¹¹

By the 27th of April, after two days of heavy fighting, it appeared that the anti-Bosch forces had gained the upper hand and were close to defeating the pro-Bosch rebels.¹² The anti-Bosch forces apparently felt strong enough at this point to plan on issuing an ultimatum to the Molina Urena Regime demanding an end to the pro-Bosch revolt and the establishment of a provisional junta. If their demands were not met they then planned a coordinated air and ground attack on the city to finish off the rebels.¹³

Efforts by U.S. Embassy officials to end the fighting during this critical phase of the civil war, appeared muddled at best. Ambassador Bennett was absent from the Dominican Republic from 23 April through 27 April. Consequently his subordinates made all of the critical early decisions that could have been useful in promoting an early end to the fighting and a negotiated settlement. However, rather than actively seeking to bring both sides to the negotiating table U.S. Embassy officials seemed to unofficially back the anti-Bosch military.¹⁴ Considering their earlier guidance from Washington to avoid any scheme involving Juan Bosch and the PRD it is not surprising that U.S. officials seemed to have turned their backs to Molina Urena and the pro-Bosch forces. Consequently, the Embassy officials remained skeptical as to

the utility of any negotiations with Molina Urena until such time as the anti-Bosch forces had gained control of the situation in Santo Domingo.¹⁵

On the morning of 27 April 1965 Ambassador Bennett finally returned to the U.S. Embassy. Almost immediately he was approached by representatives of the pro-Bosch forces who hoped to convince him to use his influence to end the air attacks against their positions in the city. Bennett also did not provide them much hope of U.S. support. Instead he replied by appealing to the pro-Bosch forces to lay down their weapons because they were losing and there was no sense to continuing the slaughter. The pro-Bosch representatives later responded via telephone with an alleged concession from Juan Bosch that he would resign his "office" in favor of Molina Urena if the U.S. feared his presence in the National Palace. Bennett, believing the anti-Bosch forces to be close to victory, rejected this proposal.

Later that afternoon heavy fighting took place in the city killing hundreds. Molina Urena, realizing that a compromise was necessary for the survival of his government went himself to the U.S. Embassy, with his staff, to personally try and convince Ambassador Bennett to use his influence to halt the anti-Bosch forces and then get them to negotiate. Bennett, again believing that the anti-Bosch forces were winning, rejected this plea.

Consequently Molina Urena and several of his colleagues, believing that all was lost, sought assylum in the Columbian Embassy. The general conduct of the meeting with Ambassador Bennett however enraged one member of Molina Urena's staff; Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Caamaño Deno. Immediately following the meeting he vowed to continue

the fight.¹⁸

Colonel Caamaño quickly assumed command of the pro-Bosch movement. He rapidly reorganized the rebel command structure, gained additional forces, consolidated positions and unified many of the dissident elements within the movement. Among the new active supporters he gained were the communists.¹⁹ In reality his forces were a conglomerate espousing no single political ideology and representing no single national program. Their allegiance to each other came from their pro-Bosch sentiments, pride and a degree of anti-United States feelings.²⁰ Yet, instead of giving up, as had been thought by the United States and the anti-Bosch military they now actually began showing signs of strength. By stiffening their resolve and consolidating their positions Caamaño Deno was able to gain control of the Ciudad Nueva (downtown) section of Santo Domingo for the pro-Bosch forces.²¹

Concurrent with the apparent strengthening of the pro-Bosch forces came the breakdown of the anti-Bosch military's attack on the city. By the evening of 27 April the tired, frightened troops belonging to General Wessin-y-Wessin were counterattacked by Lieutenant Colonel Caamaño's forces and, in a few instances, actually thrown back across the Duarte Bridge to their base in San Isidro. To the west, the forces under General Montas Guerrero entered the outskirts of Santo Domingo but halted due to a scarce knowledge of the military situation complicated by no communications with Wessin-y-Wessin. Although not fully aware of what was happening, Washington decided to order the aircraft carrier 'Boxer' (loaded with two hundred ninety-four evacuees bound for Puerto Rico) to remain on station in the area as a precaution.²²

Caamaño Deno's efforts to strengthen his hold on the city con-

tinued through Wednesday, 28 April. Earlier that morning he personally led a successful attack on a critical police station in the heart of Ciudad Nueva. The anti-Bosch forces, in contrast, were not able to regain their earlier momentum. Officials both in Washington and in the U.S. Embassy, believing that unity among the various anti-Bosch elements was needed if they ever hoped to succeed, recommended that the officers at San Isidro form a junta. Consequently, before noon on 28 April a junta was organized with Colonel Pedro Bartolome' Benoit, a former military representative to the unsuccessful negotiations held a few days earlier with the rebels, as its President.²³

Ambassador Bennett by this time had become convinced that even the organization of an anti-Bosch junta was not enough to regain control of Santo Domingo. He believed that direct U.S. assistance to the anti-Bosch junta was now necessary. A critical shortcoming of the junta forces was their lack of adequate communications equipment to control and coordinate their efforts on the ground. Bennett made a request earlier for this equipment but was given a negative response from Washington. Apparently officials there wanted to maintain a 'hands-off' attitude because they incorrectly believed that the anti-Bosch forces had the situation under control. Bennett repeated his request for the equipment stating in extremely strong language his belief that the junta was now fighting "Castro-type elements" and that they could very easily lose, if they did not receive this communication gear.²⁴ Although the equipment did finally arrive it came too late to be of any use. This particular incident is noteworthy because of the language used by the ambassador. Washington was now receiving strong indications from the Embassy that communist elements were actually taking over the revolt.

This perception of the situation in the Dominican Republic, correct or not, would prove to be the key to the eventual decision to expand the initial U.S. intervention from a solely humanitarian act to one designed to prevent a perceived communist victory. The Johnson Administration absolutely would not tolerate the creation of another Cuba.

At 1400 hours on 28 April, the chief of the Santo Domingo Police reported to the U.S. Embassy that he no longer could guarantee the lives of U.S. citizens, most of whom had gathered at the Hotel Embajador anticipating evacuation.²⁶ Although the junta publicly declared that "Operation Cleanup" was about to begin in private Benoit requested that twelve hundred U.S. Marines be landed to restore order.²⁷ Bennett relayed this request to Washington but added his own comment that he did not feel military intervention was needed yet.²⁸

Washington by now had already completed some contingency plans and preparations as a precaution. Major General Robert H. York, Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, had been preparing since Tuesday, 27 April for a parachute assault on the Dominican Republic. His mission was to first secure San Isidro Air Force Base, then the highway leading to the Duarte Bridge, and finally the bridge itself.²⁹ In addition to this a party of unarmed U.S. Marines were landed at the Port of Haina, following Benoit's request for U.S. intervention, to measure the beaches for a possible amphibious landing.³⁰ However, Washington continued to believe that intervention would not be necessary because it was still thought that the junta could overcome the pro-Bosch rebel forces. Therefore, Benoit's request was rejected.

At about 1600 hours that same afternoon, Benoit submitted a formal, written request to the American Embassy, pleading for U.S.

assistance to prevent a communist takeover of the Dominican Republic.³¹ This request was also denied seemingly because Benoit had requested aid to prevent "another Cuba" rather than to protect the lives of U.S. citizens.³² Intervention to protect the lives of one's own citizens is an internationally understood justification for intervention. Apparently officials in Washington did not feel that they were ready at this time to sanction the landing of Marines for any other reason.

Shortly after consulting with his MAAG Chief, who had just returned from San Isidro, Ambassador Bennett reversed his earlier position against intervention. The Ambassador was told that rather than "mopping up", the junta forces were retreating everywhere. The MAAG chief also reported that the morale of the junta's officer corps was broken and that American lives were now in jeopardy. Consequently, at approximately 1700 hours, almost three hours after he had recommended against intervention, Ambassador Bennett requested from Washington the "immediate landing" of U.S. Marines to protect American lives and aid in their evacuation from the Dominican Republic. Almost immediately after sending his request to Washington, Bennett asked the Commander of the Caribbean Ready Group, which had been waiting off-shore for several days, to send helicopters to pick up a large group of evacuees at the Hotel Embajador and to reinforce the Marine guards at the U.S. Embassy.³³

President Johnson formally approved the landing of U.S. Marines at 1800 hours on 28 April after several quick consultations with his closest advisory. By 1835 hours, Captain James Dare, commander of the Caribbean Ready Group received orders to land five hundred Marines to help evacuate U.S. citizens.³⁴ U.S. troops, after an absence of forty-

one years had returned to the Dominican Republic.

The United States Intervenes

At 0116 hours 29 April 1965, approximately eight hours after the first Marines had landed, Undersecretary of State Thomas C. Mann finally received from Benoit an acceptable request for military intervention to protect American lives. A properly worded request was needed for the record to justify U.S. actions in the Dominican Republic.³⁵ Colonel Benoit was quoted as saying:

Regarding my earlier request, I wish to add that American lives are in danger and conditions are of such disorder that it is impossible to provide adequate protection. Therefore, I ask you for temporary intervention to restore public order in this country.³⁶

Yet even before this request was received (in fact while the first Marines were landing) Ambassador Bennett was busy cabling new messages to Washington requesting an expansion of the intervention.³⁷ At 1930 hours on the 28th of April he sent a message to Undersecretary of State Mann that the situation was "deteriorating rapidly". Thirty minutes later he reported a "breakdown" of the junta forces and added the following crucial recommendation:

I recommend that serious thought be given to armed intervention to restore order beyond a mere protection of lives. If the present loyalist efforts fail, the power will go to groups whose aims are identical with those of the Communist Party. We might have to intervene to prevent another Cuba.³⁸

Throughout this period President Johnson and his advisors had been receiving Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Embassy reports of the existence of communists in the rebel leadership. At 1900 hours on 28 April, the new director of the CIA, William Raborn (sworn in earlier that same day), informed the President that two of the central leaders in the rebel command structure had long histories of Communist associa-

tions. One-half hour later he told congressional leaders that he had identified three known communist rebel leaders.³⁹ The President, as later statements and actions demonstrated, was determined to prevent "another Cuba". Furthermore he remembered the Bay of Pigs fiasco and was determined not to repeat the mistake the Kennedy Administration had made by committing an insufficient number of troops and equipment to the operation.⁴⁰ Since the Marine force in the area amounted to no more than a battalion landing team (approximately twelve hundred Marines) additional forces would be required. Therefore, at 0345 hours, 28 April 1965 the entire 82nd Airborne Division was formally alerted for possible employment in the Dominican Republic.⁴¹ Although the 82nd Airborne had been prepared for this possibility, it also had been directed on 26 April to form only one brigade combat team of two battalions with supporting elements (approximately 2,267 men).⁴² This set the wheels turning for a military operation significantly more massive than what had been envisioned earlier as a simple humanitarian action.

Yet, the Johnson Administration was still not ready to claim publicly its belief that the revolution had been taken over by the communists (thereby requiring an expansion of the U.S. presence). This seems to be a true statement because President Johnson apparently became annoyed with Senator Everett Dirksen for mentioning to reporters the CIA Director's story concerning the three communist rebel leaders.⁴³ The President probably may have wanted more time to prepare his case before announcing it to the American people. Reportedly there was some division among his closest advisors about how to phrase his official public statements explaining the initial landing of the Marines.⁴⁴ Perhaps he even still entertained some hopes that the junta might be able to overcome

the pro-Bosch forces in the city.

On the morning of 29 April, while the Johnson Administration was warily trying to determine the next step to take, the junta was broadcasting to the population of Santo Domingo that "Operation Cleanup is afoot and very soon the city will be free of the communist mob."⁴⁵ Unfortunately the junta's forces never entered the city. Paradoxically, the presence of U.S. forces in the city, rather than reviving the offensive spirit of the junta's forces, (as Washington had perhaps hoped) actually further paralyzed them. Wessin-y-Wessin and the other generals were apparently waiting for the Americans to "clean up" the city.⁴⁶

Ironically at this particular time it seems that if the Marines had been ordered to (and the forces were available), they could have easily occupied the city. Many of the pro-Bosch rebels actually deserted the movement when they received word that the Americans had landed.⁴⁷ However, when it became obvious that neither the Marines or Wessin-y-Wessin's forces at San Isidro were going to move against them, they regrouped and resumed the offensive. By noon on the 29th of April the U.S. Embassy was receiving reports that the Ozama Fortress, stronghold of the riot police, might fall to the rebels. According to the report, activists from the most radical of the three Major Dominican Communist parties, the Popular Dominican Movement (MPD), were playing an important role in this operation.⁴⁸

Throughout the revolt the U.S. Embassy tended to focus whatever intelligence resources it had on the activities of the communist elements in Dominican society. At the time there were three major communist groups. The largest and most active of the three was the Castro oriented Fourteenth of June Movement (MR1J4), believed to have approximately five

thousand members. This particular group took its name from the unsuccessful attempt (in 1959) of a Cuba based group of Dominican exiles to overthrow Trujillo. The MR1J4 faction contained not only communists but also more moderate elements who initially opposed Trujillo then later the anti-Bosch military.⁴⁹

The second largest faction was the Moscow oriented Dominican Communist Party (PCD), formerly known as the Dominican Socialist Party (PSPD). Drawing most of its' seven hundred members from intellectuals and professionals this group prior to the revolt operated clandestinely.⁵⁰

The smallest and as stated earlier, the most radical of the three factions was the Popular Dominican Movement (MPD), which, like the PCD was a clandestine organization. It was ideologically oriented towards Beijing, advocating the early Maoist position of world revolution through the violent overthrow of existing governments.⁵¹

Since the Embassy was preoccupied with the activities of these three groups it tended to send unbalanced reports back to Washington that failed to describe the universal nature of the revolt. In fact the Embassy knew almost nothing about the makeup of the rebel leadership.⁵² Consequently, when the pro-Bosch civilian leadership seemed to collapse (earlier in the revolt) and the activities of Colonel Caamaño and the communist factions apparently intensified, it appeared to Washington that the communists actually were taking over the revolution.

Therefore, as the Embassy's alarming reports of Communist activity, junta inaction, rebel atrocities and the general collapse of order in the city reached Washington on the afternoon of the 29th of April, Secretary of State McNamara reportedly urged that the 82nd Airborne be authorized to deploy.⁵³ Ambassador Bennett concurred with this recommen-

dation, stating that more troops were needed. Accordingly, at 1500 hours that same afternoon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by direction of the President, ordered the remaining Marines (still aboard the ships of the Caribbean Ready Group) to land. Thereby raising the total of Marines on shore to over fifteen hundred. Fourteen minutes later the Third Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division was ordered to the Dominican Republic.⁵⁴ With the issuing of these orders the character of U.S. involvement changed from one of humanitarian intervention (to save lives) to one of political intervention, to prevent another "Cuba".

The 82nd Airborne Deploys - The Intervention Widens

At 1954 hours, 29 April 1965, one thousand seven hundred fifty four paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division, aboard thirty-three C-130 aircraft, departed North Carolina for Santo Domingo. The initial plan called for a parachute drop into San Isidro airfield and then expanding this airhead ten miles west to the Ozama River Bridge. Two hours later the parachute drop was cancelled. Instead, the troopers would land at San Isidro since it had now been determined to be a secure area.⁵⁵

The first plane touched down at 0200 hours, 30 April 1965. The others followed soon after, landing in quick succession. Within one hour the entire brigade, consisting of two battalions (1st Battalion, 508th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 505th Infantry) and a supporting element (1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry and 307th Engineer Battalion) was on the ground.⁵⁶

While the 82nd Airborne troopers were enroute to Santo Domingo the Johnson Administration launched five diplomatic and military initiatives in an attempt to find a method to resolve the crisis:

1. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, President of the Council of the

Organization of American states for April, called the council into session. Bunker urged OAS Security General Jose A. Mora to contact the Papal Nuncio and request that he convey to all the parties involved in the fighting the council's desire for an immediate ceasefire.

2. The U.S. military was directed to devise a plan that would establish a "cordon" around the rebel held downtown area of Santo Domingo. In this way negotiating time would be gained for the OAS by containing the pro-Bosch rebels.

3. An informal communications channel was opened up between the White House and Juan Bosch through Abe Fortas (a close advisor to Johnson) and the Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico, Jaime Beneitez (a friend of both Fortas and Bosch).

4. Unofficial consultations began with the former President of Venezuela, Romulo Betancourt and the former Governor of Puerto Rico, Luis Munoz Marin. Jose Figures, the President of Costa Rica, was included later.

5. Former U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic John B. Martin was consulted in the hopes that he might be able to establish better contacts with the pro-Bosch rebels than Ambassador Bennett.⁵⁷

The initial results of these efforts were dismal. However, on the morning of the 30th of April, the OAS did call for a ceasefire and agreed upon the establishment of an "International Neutral Zone of Refuge" (later called the International Security Zone or ISZ) to protect the various members of the diplomatic corps in Santo Domingo.⁵⁸

In the meantime, Colonel Caamano and his forces organized an attack against the Ozama Fortress, seat of the Dominican special riot police and other commando type units. This was the first offensive

action taken by Caamano since the Marine landings. The fortress, with its cache of four thousand weapons fell effortlessly to the Caamaño forces. They had planned to take the Transportation and National Police Headquarters ultimately climaxing with an attack on San Isidro itself. However, by now it was too late because the 82nd Airborne had already arrived.⁵⁹

By mid-morning on 30 April tank-led Marines, (acting in accordance with the OAS resolution) expanded their positions around the Hotel Embajador, securing a nine square mile area that became the ISZ.⁶⁰ At San Isidor, after an additional one hundred eleven cargo aircraft had discharged tons of supplies, ammunition and equipment, the 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry, supported by a troop of the 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry and the 307th Engineer Battalion moved rapidly to the Duarte Bridge.⁶¹ Occupying several eight-story flour silos along the river, their fire could cover its western bank (including the Ozama Fortress and the entire downtown rebel stronghold) and a tiny peninsula known as Sans Souci (controlling the entry into the harbor of Santo Domingo and the southern flank of the rebel stronghold). In this way the paratroopers placed the rebels in Ciudad Nueva into a vise.⁶² By 1500 hours their bridgehead was secure.⁶³ At days end U.S. casualties were one Marine killed by sniper fire and twelve others wounded.⁶⁴

While the Marines and paratroopers were moving to consolidate their positions, the Johnson Administration was now actively pursuing a diplomatic approach that would both avoid having the United States isolated in the hemisphere for its intervention and prevent a communist takeover of the Dominican Republic.⁶⁵ The humanitarian cover that the President had used initially to justify the intervention was also now

being publicly altered to fit the changed U.S. military picture on the island. President Johnson declared for the press that "there are signs that people trained outside the Dominican Republic are seeking to gain control."⁶⁶ Privately Johnson admitted to former Ambassador Martin that he did not intend "to sit here with my hands tied and let the communists take the island." He asked rhetorically, "What can we do in Vietnam if we can't clean up the Dominican Republic?"⁶⁷

The plan to keep the United States from becoming isolated in the hemisphere called for simultaneously maneuvering the Organization of American States into supporting the U.S. and also soliciting its help in resolving the crisis. This was the task given by the President to Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Undersecretary of State George Ball. Subsequently, many U.S. diplomats were sent winging to the major capitals of South America in an attempt to accomplish these objectives. Ambassador Martin, as stated earlier, was also sent to the Dominican Republic to "open up contacts with the rebels, help the OAS and the Papal Nuncio to get a ceasefire and to find out what the facts were and report them to the President."⁶⁸

Several hours prior to Ambassador Martin's arrival, on the afternoon of 30 April, the Papal Nuncio announced (after discussions with Juan Bosch, several of his supporters in Santo Domingo, and the junta) that he had arranged a preliminary ceasefire that would take effect at 1145 hours on the 30th. Although isolated groups of rebels continued to fire on the U.S. Embassy, the Johnson Administration wanted to follow this breakthrough with an effort aimed at achieving a permanent ceasefire. By the time Ambassador Martin arrived at San Isidro, the permanent ceasefire negotiations going on there had been in progress for sev-

eral hours. After several more hours of heated discussion representatives of the junta, Colonel Caamaño, and Juan Bosch (with Ambassador Bennett and General York) signed a formal ceasefire agreement. The agreement called upon each side to stop fighting and upon the Organization of American States to arbitrate the differences between the groups.⁶⁹

At 0300 the next day, 1 May 1965, Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr. Commander of the U.S. Eighteenth Airborne Corps arrived in Santo Domingo from Fort Bragg. His orders were to take command of all land forces ashore. Six days later he replaced Vice Admiral Kleber S. Masterson as joint commander in the area.⁷⁰

Included in his command was the 82d Airborne Division, 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade; and supporting U.S. Air Force and Navy elements.⁷¹ General Palmer's ground elements totaled six thousand two hundred Marines and paratroopers but more were arriving by the hour.⁷²

Palmer's mission was complex. In addition to military operations he was charged with the responsibility for the safe evacuation of foreign nationals, the distribution of food and medical supplies (to all regardless of ideology or faction) and for establishing stable conditions in an effort to bring about an OAS engineered political settlement.⁷³ General Palmer, however, believed his most significant mission to be "making possible the establishment of a democratic regime in the Dominican Republic in accordance with the desires of its people."⁷⁴ Perhaps this was because the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earl Wheeler, reportedly gave him the following instructions orally before leaving for Santo Domingo:

Your announced mission is to save American lives. Your unstated mission is to prevent the Dominican Republic from going Communist. The President has stated that he will not allow another Cuba...You are to take all necessary measures...to accomplish this mission.⁷⁵

The unreliable condition of the Junta's forces in Santo Domingo caused Palmer to believe that the most immediate military action that U.S. forces had to take (in order to accomplish his mission) was to secure a safe route through the city for the evacuation of American and other foreign civilians.⁷⁶ Prior to the ceasefire negotiations hopes that junta forces could regroup and clear the rebels from the city had evaporated. Although stating on 30 April that his troops would make one more attempt before asking for U.S. assistance, Benoit had to withdraw his statements when it became apparent that his forces were incapable of moving.⁷⁷ Consequently, U.S. paratroopers, after having easily secured the eastern side of the Duarte Bridge now crossed it, entering the city to secure a six block radius on the west bank of the Ozama River. This action included seizing a vital rebel held power plant that forced Company C of the 1st Battalion, 505th Infantry to use close range fires and grenades to secure it. The 82d Airborne now more fully realized that this operation was not going to be quick or easy.⁷⁸ To further complicate the diplomatic and military position of the U.S., (soon after the western approaches to the Duarte Bridge had been secured) the junta's units recrossed the bridge and returned to San Isidro! Now there were absolutely no friendly forces between the U.S. paratroopers and U.S. Marines. This placed the United States into the unenviable position of possibly having to fight the rebels alone. Consequently, when the ceasefire negotiations were successfully completed (despite complaints from General York) U.S. forces were directly to strictly

comply with them.⁷⁹ However, this precluded the linkup of U.S. Marines and paratroopers. Accordingly this decision was to cause some friction between U.S. diplomats and the U.S. military.

Ambassador Martin was concerned that the United States not be cast into the role of an international oppressor, crushing the efforts of a people struggling to be free. He wanted to prevent a "U.S. Hungary." He also wanted to reassure Juan Bosch and his followers that the U.S. was neutral; therefore, if U.S. troops did move into the city they would not be followed by General Wessin-y-Wessin's forces. Consequently he strongly advised Washington to force U.S. troops to abide by the ceasefire. The U.S. military, conversely, believed that due to continued rebel attacks and the untenability of their unlinked positions it was necessary to move into the city to join their forces (and possibly even put down the rebellion if necessary). In this way their military mission could be better accomplished. Ambassador Bennett also supported the military's position.⁸⁰

The Johnson Administration, concerned about preventing another Cuba but also concerned about hemispheric opinions, attempted to equally satisfy both sides of the U.S. troop disposition issue. To appease the military, additional troops and materiel were deployed to Santo Domingo to be used to advance U.S. positions into the city, if necessary. However, to appease U.S. and Latin American diplomats, limits were placed on their use. In addition further actions to resolve the crisis through the OAS were being coordinated. A five man OAS Special Committee was ordered by the OAS to leave for Santo Domingo immediately. In order to please the more liberal members of the OAS the U.S. realized it would have to eliminate any impression that it was favoring the junta;

therefore, instructions were sent to U.S. military commanders in Santo Domingo to avoid overidentification with junta forces.⁸¹ The U.S. was now attempting to publicly conform with the announced objective of its intervention; to only protect lives and preserve law and order. In this way a more regionally pleasing neutral stance could be assumed.

Yet, in spite of assurances to the rebels and others, a reconnaissance patrol from Troop A, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry did move out on 1 May to link up with Marines in the ISZ. The patrol met resistance and lost two men killed and five wounded.⁸² Learning of this move Colonel Caamaño called Ambassador Martin to protest. A flurry of communications followed that immediately resulted in a U.S. decision to halt the advance of any of its forces. Furthermore, any patrols that had linked up were ordered back to their original positions. The rules of engagement were tightened so that even if firing and maneuvering in self defense U.S. forces would still have to return to their original positions after the fight was over. Restrictions were also placed on the types of weapons that could be used. General Palmer was reported to reflect later that political decisions were being made "without taking into account important military considerations."⁸³

By the second of May, General Palmer reported to Washington that unless U.S. forces were allowed to use their power to stabilize the situation in Santo Domingo there was a real threat that the Dominican Republic would fall to the rebels. Palmer now suggested that a "Cordon" be established through the heart of Santo Domingo, connecting the Marines in the ISZ to the 82d Airborne in San Isidro. The route suggested would have been established along Avenida Mella, through Plaza Independencia and up Avenida Independencia. In this way the rebels would not only

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1965 CRISIS IN TH. (U) ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF
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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
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be confined to downtown Santo Domingo, but also they would be denied the city's telecommunications facilities, its main post office and the major banks. An alternate or minimum resistance route was also proposed in an attempt to lessen the chances of large scale rebel and civilian casualties. This second "cordon" essentially followed the route taken by the ill-fated U.S. patrol of the previous day along Avenida San Martin. However, in either case Palmer insisted that a "cordon" to contain the rebels and insure the protection and resupplying of the ISZ was essential for accomplishing his mission. Otherwise, the ISZ (and the U.S. Embassy) was accessible only by helicopter or by sea (over the beaches) since the rebels held the city's port facilities.⁸⁴

Ambassador Martin continued to oppose this position, arguing that the possibility of a communist takeover was gone now that U.S. forces had landed. Even Ambassador Bennett changed his position, agreeing with Martin that it was essential to use the ceasefire to gain time for negotiations, especially now that the OAS was involved.⁸⁵

The debate was finally resolved on 2 May when the Johnson Administration finally determined how U.S. forces would be positioned. Permission was given to the 82d Airborne Division to establish a "Line of Communication" (LOC) linking the ISZ with the San Isidro Air Base. In this way the LOC's existence could be justified publicly as a land route to be used for evacuating U.S. and foreign nationals from the city. (Thereby being consistent with U.S. official humanitarian reasons for the intervention.) Accordingly, after the U.S. Embassy received the approval of the plan by the OAS Special Committee, General Palmer was directed to proceed with its execution on 3 May.⁸⁶

Soon after midnight on 3 May the 2d Battalion of the 325th In-

fantry and the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 505th Infantry moved out to secure the LOC. The plan called for a night operation in order to avoid involving non-combatants as well as to maximize the effect of surprise. Tactically the battalions maneuvered using essentially a "leap frog" technique. While the lead battalion was holding an area, the next battalion in line would pass through the secured area, advance and then hold the next objective along the route of march. The third battalion then passed through the two lead battalions to accomplish the actual link up with the Marines in the ISZ. The entire operation took one hour and fourteen minutes to complete, encountering only light resistance. On 4 May the paratroopers widened the LOC in order to minimize direct fire into the area.⁸⁷

Now the city of Santo Domingo was bisected, east to west. Colonel Caamaño's territory was divided in two with his main stronghold in Ciudad Nueva and the capital's business district in effect surrounded by American forces. He was hemmed in by the Marines in the ISZ to the west, by the LOC to the north and by the 82d Airborne Division's positions across the Ozama River to the east and southeast. North of the LOC, in the industrial area of Santo Domingo and adjoining neighborhoods, the rebels maintained some control. However because they were basically inexperienced irregulars, and now were cut off from their headquarters to the south, their hold on the area could be considered tenuous at best.⁸⁸

The LOC, beginning at the Duarte Bridge and ending near the Presidential Palace not only marked a dividing line through the heart of Santo Domingo, but also marked a turning point for the United States. Fourteen thousand U.S. Paratroopers and Marines in the city made laugh-

able any humanitarian defense for the intervention. President Johnson's statement of 3 May 1965, defending U.S. actions in the Dominican Republic, clearly explains what he had in mind when he ordered U.S. troops there:

We don't propose to sit here in our rocking chairs with our hands folded and let the Communists set up any government they want in the Western Hemisphere.⁸⁹

Consequently the Johnson Administration tried to provide proof that the communists had actually taken over the revolt. On 2 May, according to American Intelligence, fifty-five communist and Castroist plotters (some allegedly from outside the country) were reported to be trying to take over the rebel movement (three days later the number was reduced to fifty-four).⁹⁰ The three communist organizations involved in the revolt (the PDC, MPD and MR1J4) were accused of maneuvering to gain control of strategic areas of Santo Domingo.⁹¹ Perhaps the evidence that most greatly influenced the President's decision to expand U.S. involvement came from Ambassador Martin after his two days of meetings with Colonel Caamaño and other rebel leaders. In an article written for Life Magazine he mentioned the names of ten communist leaders, also listed in the American intelligence reports, who had joined the revolt.⁹² In spite of his initial position against an expanded role for U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic, Ambassador Martin was reported to have become quickly convinced that Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) had become Communist dominated after its "democratic elements" vanished or took refuge in foreign embassies.⁹³ Consequently, Martin believed that the only way to resolve the crisis was to prolong the ceasefire and create a more stable, cohesive junta whose function would be to prepare the country for eventual democratic elec-

tions. Because of his disillusionment with the rebels he broke all contacts with them. Unfortunately this also broke U.S. Embassy contacts with the rebels as well. Martin sincerely believed that what the situation now called for was a "third force" government to replace the PRD and challenge the communists.⁹⁴

While Martin was trying to influence Washington's policies regarding the Dominican government the pro-Bosch forces carried on efforts to consolidate their position in the city. These efforts were manifested in their attempts at internal reorganization culminating on the night of 3-4 May with the secret election of Colonel Caamaño (by both houses of Congress) to the Presidency of the Republic. At this time a cabinet and military staff were also created.⁹⁵ Juan Bosch, after hearing of Caamaño's election relinquished his claims to the Presidency.⁹⁶

In order to create another government, capable of challenging that of Colonel Caamano, Ambassador Martin, with U.S. acquiescence helped to engineer the disbandment of the three-man military junta, headed by Benoit, with a five-man civilian-military junta called the National Government of Reconstruction. The new junta was to be headed by Brigadier General Antonio Imbert Barrera, a survivor of the group that had assassinated Trujillo and an old friend of Ambassador Martin. The second member of the junta was the outgoing head of the preceeding junta, Benoit. The three remaining civilian members of the junta proved to be a chore to locate. Martin was searching specifically for civilian membership that would provide a semblance of respectability to the new government. Unfortunately many of those asked refused to participate. After several days three civilians accepted. The first, Alejandro Zeller Cocco was an engineer and, until then, unknown. The second, Carlos Grisolia

Poloney had been an elected Senator, Minister of Labor under the Triumvirate and then governor of Puerto Plata. The third was a relatively well known publisher and editor Julio D. Postigo.⁹⁷

On 7 May 1965 the Government of National Reconstruction was installed. After being sworn in, Imbert outlined in a brief policy statement the objectives of his government: (a) the establishment of peace; (b) Conciliation, guaranteeing people's lives; (c) national unity; (d) full cooperation with the OAS peace plans; (e) progressive democracy; (f) economic reconstruction.⁹⁸ Two days later, in an effort to gain popular support, the new government fired eight officers belonging to the anti-Bosch forces including the army chief of staff. General De los Santos remained however as the air force chief of staff and Wessiny-Wessin retained his position as the armed forces chief of staff. Colonel Caamaño reportedly said, after hearing of this development "They have killed the flies but left the beetles."⁹⁹

While each side was regrouping, the visiting OAS Commission, assisted by Ambassador Bennett, completed negotiations with the contending parties for a formal truce agreement. The agreement, signed on 5 May 1965 provided for: (a) an immediate end to hostilities, (b) demarcation of the zones held by both sides; (c) protection of foreign embassies and safety for all refugees and exiles, (d) distribution of food and medicine to all factions. The agreement also provided for an International Zone held by U.S. troops to keep the belligerents separated.¹⁰⁰

In the first seven days of the crisis the United States had landed over fourteen thousand troops in the Dominican Republic, evacuated over five thousand six hundred U.S. and foreign citizens, pre-

vented what the Johnson Administration perceived to be a communist take-over and, for its efforts, was not isolated diplomatically because the OAS chose to take an active role in helping to resolve the problem. Having avoided these initial pitfalls, the Johnson Administration now turned its attention towards devising a political solution that would quickly permit the withdrawal of U.S. troops.¹⁰¹ However, by this time it was becoming evident that the crisis would be anything but short-lived.

Searching for a Solution

In spite of the fact that the United States had failed to notify the OAS (for security reasons according to President Johnson) of its initial decision to deploy troops to the Dominican Republic, the Johnson Administration pressed the organization anyway to help resolve the civil war. Understandably, OAS involvement was important to the United States for two reasons: first, it would prevent the U.S. from being isolated diplomatically for its unilateral action and second; it would provide a legal basis for the expanded U.S. military presence (for other than humanitarian reasons). Consequently, after some initial foot dragging (Mexico, Chile and Uruguay refused to support the U.S.) the OAS acted to assist the United States.

Accordingly, on 1 May 1965 the OAS foreign ministers approved (without dissent) a Mexican resolution establishing the five-man OAS Peace commission that helped bring about the truce agreement signed on 5 May.

After three days of unexpectedly heated debate the OAS approved (by a fourteen to five vote) a U.S. resolution to establish an Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) allegedly needed to guarantee the ceasefire

arrangement and help restore order. However, this controversial act also provided the legal basis the U.S. needed to maintain a large contingent of its troops in the Dominican Republic for an extended period of time. The approval of this resolution also raised a question concerning the diplomatic legerdemain the U.S. used to get the required fourteen votes needed for passage.

Apparently the U.S. was initially able to muster only thirteen votes. In order to raise the additional vote needed for passage, Washington engineered the seating of Jose Antonio Bonnilla Atilas, a former delegate to the council under the Reid Cabral government, as the official Dominican delegate to the OAS. Prior to his acceptance as a delegate there had been no representative from the Dominican Republic. This happened because each of the contending factions had its own designee, none of whom were recognized by the OAS. With the seating of Bonilla the United States got its fourteenth vote thereby making the IAPF a reality.

Only six Latin American countries actually participated in the IAPF. Brazil contributed the largest contingent (excluding the United States) with one thousand one hundred fifty two men. Honduras was next with two hundred fifty, followed by Paraguay with one hundred seventy eight, Nicaragua with one hundred fifty nine, Costa Rica contributed twenty one policemen and finally El Salvador with three men. It is perhaps ironic to note that while the United States was publicly searching for a democratic solution to the Dominican problem, it required the services of a peace force comprised almost totally (Costa Rica was the exception) of contingents from nations ruled by dictators.¹⁰² Nevertheless, on 23 May 1965 the "Act of Creation of the Interamerican Force"

was signed, a Unified Command established and on 29 May 1965 Hugo Panasco Alvim, a Brazilian general, assumed command with General Bruce Palmer as his deputy.¹⁰³

While the Johnson Administration was trying to work its way through the crisis, its policies came increasingly under pressure from American liberals and the United Nations.

Domestic criticism appeared to be spearheaded by Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Fulbright contended that the U.S. "intervened forcibly and illegally not to save lives but to prevent the victory of a revolutionary movement that was judged to be communist dominated."¹⁰⁴ He further contended that the United States was at fault for having rejected a 25 April 1965 request from Juan Bosch and the PRD for a U.S. presence in the Dominican Republic and a rebel 27 April 1965 appeal for U.S. mediation and a negotiated settlement. All this happened, he believed, because the U.S. Ambassador Bennett and the Johnson Administration "anticipated and desired a victory of the anti-rebel forces."¹⁰⁵

The United Nations Security Council acted in response to the Dominican crisis on 14 May 1965. On that day the Council unanimously approved a Jordanian resolution calling on the UN Secretary General (U Thant) to send a representative to Santo Domingo to report on the situation. This action took place apparently in response to an appeal from Dominican rebel foreign minister Jottin Curry, calling for the immediate intervention of the U.N. Secretary General to prevent the destruction of Santo Domingo and its inhabitants. On 19 May the Security Council unanimously supported a statement by the Council President, Radhakrishnan Ramarri of Malaysia, requesting that U Thant's represen-

tative in the Dominican Republic attempt to obtain an immediate truce to enable the Red Cross to evacuate the dead and wounded. (General Imbert subsequently agreed to this action on 21 May). On 14 May the council also listened to representatives of the opposing Dominican factions. The rebel representative countered by arguing that the junta was the only legitimate government in the Dominican Republic. Ultimately the UN Security Council rejected a Soviet resolution condemning the United States and approving (with the U.S. abstaining) a French resolution requesting a permanent ceasefire.¹⁰⁶

As pressures mounted on the United States to arrive at a settlement of the Dominican Crisis, the Johnson Administration decided to open up negotiations directly with the rebels. Unfortunately, since Ambassadors Bennett and Martin were not held in highest esteem by the Caamano forces they were deemed ineffective as negotiators by Washington.¹⁰⁷ Consequently, on 13 May a four man U.S. fact finding mission representing President Johnson arrived in Santo Domingo. The team, consisting of Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, Defense Undersecretary Cyrus Vance, State Undersecretary (for economic affairs) Thomas S. Mann, and Assistant State Secretary (for Inter-American Affairs) Jack Hood Vaughn. They reportedly brought a U.S. proposal to establish a coalition government headed by political moderate Antonio Guzman Silvestre. Guzman's qualifications included: agriculture minister in the cabinet of former President Juan Bosch, membership in the PRD and he was friend of the United States. The "Guzman Proposal" (reportedly designed by Bosch, Luis Munoz Marin and Jaime Benitez) called for the following: (1) Guzman would be called on to finish Juan Bosch's term on the basis of the 1963 constitution; (2)

call for a national plebiscite to support or reject that constitution in sixty days; (3) form a Government of National Reconciliation consisting of cabinet members representing the major political, economic and social viewpoints.¹⁰⁸ Additionally, in 1966, (the expiration date of Juan Bosch's original term of office) elections would be held for a new president.¹⁰⁹

On 16 May 1965, at a meeting with the U.S. Fact Finding Mission, Colonel Caamano reportedly accepted the Guzman Proposal. By the evening of 23 May, Guzman and McGeorge Bundy had worked out the details of the new government to include: who would be in the Cabinet, who would head the Armed Forces (Wessin-y-Wessin, de los Santos and Rivera Caminero would be exiled) and what to do about the communists (strict surveillance and immediate arrest for any wrong doings, all under U.S. supervision). However, at the last minute the entire Guzman Plan was disowned by Washington. By the morning of 24 May McGeorge Bundy received new instructions from the U.S. He did not try to reopen the negotiations and on 26 May, he returned to Washington.¹¹⁰

Why the United States changed its position is unclear. Although Imbert strongly objected to the plan calling Guzman a "Bosch Puppet" and stating that "if they (the U.S.) wanted to turn the country over to communism, we would have no part in it."¹¹¹ However, he and the junta depended for its survival on U.S. support and would therefore have to bow to U.S. pressure, if it were applied. It appears that in the continuing debate between liberal and hard line elements in Washington, the hard liners may have convinced the Johnson Administration that the Guzman Proposal was not a sure guarantee against an eventual communist takeover. There also may have been a lobbying effort on the part

of certain Dominican business interests who equally distrusted the Guzman Proposal.¹¹² Nonetheless the pro-Bosch faction suffered an important political reverse with the demise of this plan. Sadly for their movement they also suffered an important military setback during this same time period.

Fighting broke out again on 13 May 1965 when junta forces launched an all out drive to eliminate Colonel Caamaño's forces north of the LOC. Five days later they had driven the rebels into a corner between the Ozama River and U.S. troops guarding the ISZ. By 19 May the junta's troops gained another ten blocks and captured the rebel radio station. During this fighting U.S. troops were accused of supporting the junta because as the retreating rebels attempted to flee south across the LOC (to rejoin Caamaño's forces in Ciudad Nueva) they were fired on by patrolling U.S. troops. A similar series of events occurred in the area around the Duarte Bridge.

Yet, the U.S. could not be accused of being completely pro-junta during the fighting. On 13 May when the junta operation commenced, their air force planes accidentally strafed U.S. troops in the LOC. Later in the day they actually lost one of their planes to U.S. ground fire after it strafed an area near the U.S. Embassy.¹¹³ Shortly after these incidents Company A, 1st Battalion, 505th Infantry received one of the more bizarre missions of the Dominican Campaign when it was ordered to ground the junta's air force. It was explained to the paratroopers that this operation was necessary in order to prevent "direct military action between the two Dominican factions."¹¹⁴ Albeit, (for whatever reason) the Dominican Air Force did not fly again during the crisis.

The fighting finally stopped when a twelve hour truce to permit the removal of the dead and wounded sponsored by the United Nations (as discussed earlier) became effective on 21 May and continued indefinitely. However, just prior to the ceasefire going into effect, General Imbert was able to announce that his forces were in "full control" in the northern sector of Santo Domingo.¹¹⁴

Surprisingly, in spite of accusations leveled at the United States during the fighting, Colonel Caamaño assured OAS Secretary General Jise A. Mora that he considered the U.S. to be neutral and would negotiate with the U.S. but not Imbert.¹¹⁵

By 3 June 1965 a second OAS Peace Committee had been organized after the first resigned on 20 May in protest over U.S. and UN interference. The new committee consisted of American Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Ambassador Ilmar Penna Marinho of Brazil and Ramon de Clairmont Dueñas of El Salvador. This new committee reopened negotiations with Caamaño's forces; however, now their proposals were not as conciliatory as those of previous OAS and U.S. delegations. Consequently, negotiations were to drag out over the next three months.¹¹⁶

Caamaño's negotiating committee first met with the new OAS delegation on 10 June 1965. At this meeting they repeated their demands for a government presided over by a moderate (like Guzman) from Ciudad Nueva. Whoever this president might be would remain in office through 1966 when Juan Bosch's original term of office would have expired. Its legal instrument would be the 1963 constitution. Their position was essentially identical to the Guzman Proposal; however, they also demanded that the Congress elected in December of 1962 be reconvened.¹¹⁷

After thirteen days of talks, during which (on 15-16 June)

heavy fighting erupted between Caamano's troops and U.S. and Brazilian troops, the ruling junta of Antonio Imbert and Colonel Caamano accepted in principle an OAS peace plan. The plan called for the following: (a) OAS supervised elections in six to nine months; (b) pending the election's results, a provisional government would be formed under a temporary charter. A new, permanent constitution would then be drawn up later by an elected constitutional convention; (c) all armed forces would return to their barracks; (d) armed civilians would turn in their weapons; (e) the IAPF would remain in the Dominican Republic.¹¹⁷

In the face of their virtual military defeat on 15-16 June (losing a fifty-six block area of Ciudad Nueva to the 82d Airborne, the arrest of approximately five hundred supporters and over two hundred casualties) Caamaño's forces were in no position to press their demands for a government headed by a moderate member of the PRD and the 1963 constitution.¹¹⁸ In a ten page response to the OAS committee, on 23 June, Caamaño formally reversed his position; however, he insisted that their weapons be turned over to the provisional government not the OAS and called for the withdrawal of the IAPF one month after the provisional government was installed. He also demanded the inclusion of the Bill of Rights section of the 1963 constitution into the temporary charter under which the provisional government was to rule.¹¹⁹

The junta's response to the plan was simply that they agreed with the formation of a new political structure. However, Imbert insisted that the current junta should provide the basis for any future provisional government.¹²⁰

From 30 June on the negotiations centered on selecting the

president of the provisional government. Colonel Caamano and his followers recommended a series of candidates that were politically more inclined to their position. However, the OAS committee and especially Ellsworth Bunker, favored only one person, Hector Garcia-Godoy.

Garcia-Godoy had been foreign minister under Juan Bosch. He had also been a former member of Joaquin Balaguer's Reformista Party before leaving it to become vice-president of the country's most important cigarette manufacturer (Tabacalera). On 7 July 1965, Ambassador Bunker declared "categorically" that "having received the lists of all the available candidates, we have reached the following conclusion...Senor Hector Garcia-Godoy is the answer to the problem."¹²¹ By 12 July, after conferring with junta leaders and Colonel Caamaño, Garcia-Godoy was approved by both sides.

Over the next few weeks negotiations continued between the two sides and the OAS committee. By 9 August 1965, the remaining obstacles to acceptance of the Act of Dominican Reconciliation (which was essentially the OAS proposal of 23 June 1965) were: (a) Colonel Caamaño's continued objection that the act did not provide for the immediate withdrawal of the IAPF and (b) the junta's opposition to an OAS committee amendment that provided for meetings between the provisional government and the OAS to determine jointly the manner and data in which the IAPF was to be withdrawn.¹²²

After three more weeks of negotiations, on 29 August 1965, Caamaño's Negotiating Committee and the OAS committee gave their final approval to the texts of the Act of Dominican Reconciliation and the Institutional Act that had been established to regulate the provisional government. The junta, however, was still not convinced that this solu-

tion was the acceptable method to end the civil war. Consequently, under pressure from the United States, the Dominican Joint Chiefs of Staff, abandoned the junta and agreed to sign the two acts. Deserted by his military supporters, Imbert angrily resigned his office during a television broadcast on the evening of 30 August, after thoroughly denouncing the OAS plan. Within hours of Imbert's resignation, the remaining members of the junta also resigned.¹²³

The Civil War Ends

On 3 September 1965, after five months of civil war, a provisional government headed by Hector Garcia-Godoy and supported by the two opposing sides was installed. This act formally ended the Dominican Civil War.

The cabinet of President Garcia-Godoy included members from all factions. In addition, twenty-four hours after his installation, Garcia-Godoy undermined the power base of General Wessin-y-Wessin by revoking the autonomy of his command at San Isidro (reducing it to the status of an ordinary military installation). Five days later, Wessin-y-Wessin was pressured into leaving the country, becoming Dominican consul general in Miami. This is not to imply that Garcia-Godoy was given a free hand to clean out all past members of the anti-Bosch military. The armed forces remained under the control of Imbert's chiefs of staff and at times this presented problems to the government.

One such instance occurred on 19 December 1965 when several hundred troops of the Dominican Air Force and Army attacked a Santiago hotel (The Matum) housing approximately one hundred of Caamaño's supporters (including Caamaño himself). The attack occurred after Caamaño and his followers had returned to the hotel from a funeral of one of the leaders of the April revolt. The battle lasted eight hours and

ended only after the IAPF intervened. Subsequently, after receiving the results of an official inquiry, Garcia-Godoy issued on 6 January 1966 orders stripping a group of right wing military leaders of their commands and then assigning them to overseas posts. The orders also applied to several of the former rebel leaders including Colonel Caamaño.

Reaction to the Presidential orders was immediate. The very same day they were issued a group of right wing soldiers seized the government radio station and telecommunications center. The IAPF intervened again, forcing the mutineers to surrender on 8 January 1966. Yet, in spite of government pressure, the former junta loyalists refused to leave the country. They continued to defy the government order even after Caamano had left to assume military attache duties in Washington (on 22 January 1966).

A solution to this problem was finally worked out in February when the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to be reduced to deputy ministers of the armed forces (with the exception of the Naval Chief Rivera Caminero who was posted to Washington instead).

Although violence, such as the Matum Hotel incident, had become common since Garcia-Godoy's installation in September, it did not disturb plans for the elections promised by the provisional government. On 3 March 1966, Garcia-Godoy set 1 June 1966 as the election date for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency. Elections for the senate and city government would also take place on that day. On 10 April 1966 Juan Bosch, who had returned home from exile on 25 September 1965, was nominated as the PRD candidate for President. Joaquin Balaguer was nominated by the Reformista Party and Rafael Bonnelly by the Revolutionary Van-

guard Party. Bosch was also supported by the Christian Social Revolutionary and the now legalized Fourteenth of June Movement. Bonnelly, on the other side of the political spectrum, was supported by the right wing Movement of National Integration and the Evolutionary Liberal Party.

After a bitter campaign in which both Bosch and Balaguer had threatened to withdraw (because of interference by the military and the issuance of voter registration cards), Balaguer was elected with fifty-seven percent of the vote. Bosch took second place with thirty-nine percent.

Balaguer was inaugurated on 1 July 1966 with his Vice President Francisco Lora and a twelve member cabinet. He quickly took control of the military, banishing General Wessin-y-Wessin to the Dominican delegation at the UN and curbs the size and influence of the Armed Forces.

Concurrent with Balaguer's inauguration the first elements of IAPF, ninety-six members of the 82d Airborne Division, left for the U.S. By 19 September 1966 the last member of a U.S. force which had once numbered over twenty-three thousand departed the Dominican Republic. U.S. military action was now complete, the Intervention was over.

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CHAPTER 5

UPDATE, ANALYSIS, AND CONCLUSIONS

Dominican Update: The Post-Intervention Years

During the first years of his presidency, Joaquin Balaguer tried to calm the violent passions which had been aroused by the Civil War. He placed members of the rebel opposition into his cabinet, curbed military interference in politics, and tried to gain middle class and rural confidence in his government. In spite of his efforts the level of tension in the streets remained high for several years.¹

The healing process eventually did take hold with time and an expanding national economy. Hence, with U.S. assistance, high sugar prices (approximately sixty cents per pound), the exploitation of new mineral resources, and a strong government, Balaguer's reelection in 1970 was insured.

The early years of the new decade saw the Dominican economy grow at the exciting annual rate of eleven percent. The continued strong price of sugar, providing almost fifty percent of the nation's foreign exchange, kept Middle Eastern oil, U.S. food products and consumer goods flowing into the country. The Dominican Republic soon began taking on the outward appearance of a developed nation.²

Concurrent with this period of remarkable growth, Balaguer was able to demonstrate, on two notable occasions, his ability to retain power. First he crushed an attempted right wing coup in 1971. Then, in February 1973, Dominican soldiers intercepted and killed Colonel

Caamaño several days after he and nine men had secretly landed (by boat) in the southwest corner of the nation. Caamaño had been in Cuba since 1967. While there he became an adherent of Che's "foco" theory. Although exiled he never lost his faith that one day he could return to the Dominican Republic to re-implant his political ideals. Sadly for him, payment for this faith would require his life.

Balaguer was reelected again in 1974. His strong government policies continued his success at the polls. Yet, dark economic clouds were beginning to appear on the horizon. Oil prices after the 1973 embargo were beginning to explode. Simultaneously, the price of sugar was beginning its catastrophic decline to where today, at six cents per pound, it is eleven cents cheaper than it costs to produce. Consequently, throughout the remainder of the decade sugar production fell as cane fields were shut down. Unemployment grew correspondingly over the same period of time. By the summer of 1983 it reached thirty percent with no relief predicted.⁴

Economic and social reforms still had yet to touch the majority of the Dominican people. Six percent of the population continues to control forty percent of the wealth. Most of the population remains rural peasant, among whom unemployment hovers around fifty percent and illiteracy eighty percent. Disease and malnutrition still stalks them.⁵

Just prior to the economy beginning its decline, Juan Bosch (in November 1973) split from the PRD to create a more militant and revolutionary party, the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD). Apparently the PRD, now under the control of Francisco Peña Gomez, had become too moderate for Bosch's liking. However, in spite of the split, the presidential election of May 1978 saw the election of the PRD candidate, Antonio

Guzman.

This election, many analysts believe was the first really free election the Dominican people have ever experienced. Balaguer's past elections were apparently not free of government influence. However in 1978, under pressure from the Carter Administration, Balaguer conducted a free election and lost.⁶

Since 1978 personal liberties have increased, political exiles have been returned home, and political parties (including the Communists) are allowed to organize freely. The military has been restrained from politics and a two-party system (the PRD and Balaguer's Reformista Party) dominates the congress.

In August 1983, Salvador Jorge Blanco took office as the latest, freely elected President. His task is a great one because the government at the time of his election was already four hundred eighty five billion dollars in default on a one billion dollar external debt.⁸

In the months since August he has drastically reduced the salaries of government workers, imposed a ten percent luxury tax and declared a ban on one hundred fifty imports ranging from cars to peanut butter and other food items.⁹

Taking into account the past history of the Dominican Republic the people seem to be relatively supportive of the government policies. Hopefully they will remain that way.

Analysis of Lessons Learned from the 1965 Crisis

General Observations

The Dominican Crisis of 1965 demonstrated that the United States does not need to feel that the only threat to Latin American security is Cuba and Che Guevara's model for revolution. Although troublesome

as they may be from the U.S. perspective, history has shown that every attempt to implant a Cuban style insurgency in the Dominican Republic has failed. The revolt in 1965 was not a Castro inspired or directed revolution. In truth it was a civil war that began when the Dominican Armed Forces simultaneously split over support to Juan Bosch and totally refused to support the regime of Reid Cabral. The violent uprising climaxed a four year struggle within Dominican society to fill the void left by the death of Trujillo in 1961. Whatever Communist participation there was in the revolt was limited to the three small native Dominican Communist organizations discussed in Chapter 4. However even these groups had been all but eliminated early in the revolt. By 19 May 1965 the MRIJ4 was basically leaderless and fragmented, the PCD had been reduced to a cadre of sixty men and the MPD refused to sacrifice its small cadres in a struggle "dominated by the bourgeoisie."

Therefore, the Dominican episode showed that the only real threat to Dominican security came from the inability of their society to produce an acceptable form of government to replace Trujillo. Communists did not create this condition. The condition existed because no one person or group was able to gather the support needed to sustain a government in the face of unrelenting pressure from other interest groups. In the past, the Dominican Armed Forces had been counted on to provide the strength needed to keep a government in power. However, in 1965, because they were divided, the armed forces could not do this. Therefore chaos followed as each faction struggled to gain supremacy over the other.

Experience has shown that this kind of situation was not uncommon to the Dominican people. Dominican history seems to be nothing more than

a relentless cycle of strong men (or juntas) whose death or ouster would create a vacuum that various factions would struggle to fill. If past crises were not resolved quickly, by either the beleaguered government or powerful contending interest groups, the traditional response of the incumbent regime has been to appeal for foreign assistance. This was precisely the situation that existed in 1965 when initially the Reid Cabral government and then later the Benoit junta, appealed for U.S. intervention to restore order and prevent an alleged communist take over. A badly informed and panicked U.S. Embassy, possessing both preconceived notions about communists in the rebel forces and a predisposition towards an anti-Bosch junta, forced President Johnson to make an eleventh-hour decision to either intervene militarily or face "another Cuba." This situation coupled with Johnson's own strong feelings about preventing the spread of Communism in this hemisphere made the intervention almost inevitable.

Hence, U.S. troops arrived in the Dominican Republic professing the humanitarian nature of their mission (as justification for their presence) but believing they were really there to save the incumbent government from communist rebels. In reality they helped to forcibly install a new government designed to both repair the fractured Dominican political structure and help the nation make its first, historic (albeit shaky) steps, towards a real democracy. In the process of doing this the United States made some mistakes but also did many things correctly.

U.S. Mistakes

Perhaps the greatest mistake the United States made during the Dominican Crisis was not resolving it before resorting to military in-

tervention. Ambassador Bennett had ample opportunity to arrive at a negotiated settlement that would have restored democracy to the Dominican Republic without having to use U.S. troops to do it. However, his preconceived notions of what a PRD government would mean caused him to side with any opposition junta that could restore order. This position ultimately forced Molina Urena and other moderates into asylum thereby leaving control of the rebels to their more radical and now understandably anti-American members.

Washington also shared this rather myopic view of the situation because the U.S. Embassy and the CIA did an extremely poor job of presenting any other view. At that time in history the psychological scars left from Castro's move to communism were still fresh in Washington. President Johnson was determined to prevent the creation of another communist government in this hemisphere especially at a time when the U.S. was making its stand in Vietnam. It was for this reason, U.S. intelligence gathering assets tended to focus on what the Communists were doing in Santo Domingo and essentially nothing else. When violence finally erupted and the Embassy's surprised, inexperienced, and temporarily short-handed staff panicked, the only information Washington received from them was terribly distorted and at times terribly late. Therefore Washington actually deployed troops based upon its own preconceived notions, reinforced by those of others and not on hard facts.

It was perhaps because of this lack of timely, accurate information that the Johnson Administration tended to waffle in its support for any of the factions involved in the crisis. Although Washington did not favor Juan Bosch and the PRD, because of their alleged communist affiliations, the administration also chose to withhold material support

for the junta during the critical early stages of the revolt. The issue of the junta's request for badly needed radio equipment is a prime example of Washington's equivocation. When the junta first requested the equipment they were refused because Washington believed them to be winning. When it finally became apparent they weren't winning the equipment was sent; however, by then it was too late.

A coherent, resolute policy based upon timely accurate information was critically needed during the opening phase of the revolt. Unfortunately it was non-existent, hence Washington stumbled almost blindly into intervention.

What Did the U.S. Do Correctly?

After the rushed decision to intervene had been made, the Johnson Administration seemed to take a more measured and thoughtful approach towards resolving the crisis. Consequently the United States made many correct decisions regarding the employment of its diplomatic and military assets, thereby increasing the chances for an acceptable outcome.

Diplomatically, the initial decisions to actively involve the OAS in negotiations and the creation of the IAPF added credibility to the U.S. claim of neutrality during the crisis and legitimized its involvement. Militarily, the decision to deploy U.S. troops rapidly and massively caught the rebels off guard and prevented them from gaining a victory. Yet, after troops were deployed they were tightly controlled by Washington in order to minimize bloodshed. The decision to encircle rather than destroy the rebels also enhanced the appearance of U.S. neutrality and bought time for negotiations. Politically, Washington realized that a long lasting solution would require a strategy that had to involve the opposing sides in active negotiations. Therefore the de-

cision to open and maintain communications with the rebels through various fact finding and peace commissions, helped to start and keep the negotiations alive. In this way a not altogether unacceptable, negotiated settlement was signed (albeit under U.S. pressure) ending the revolt. Perhaps the most important decision the Johnson Administration made, in spite of the anti-communist rhetoric, was its decision to pursue a negotiated settlement designed to lay the groundwork for a successful future democratic system in the Dominican Republic. This was the real mission of the U.S. and it was towards that end that all efforts seemed to be directed.

I believe the reason these ultimately correct decisions were made was because the key decision makers were guided by the following principles: (a) Military strategies must be governed by political objectives; (b) the U.S. would not be responsible for an "American Budapest" in Santo Domingo; (c) The U.S. would not be isolated diplomatically by this issue; (d) Yet, if force is used it will be employed swiftly and massively.

The first principle was revealed in the literature of this time period concerning low intensity warfare and counterinsurgency strategies. These topics had become fashionable during the Kennedy Administration and undoubtedly the Johnson Administration shared the same interest. Consequently, Washington must have certainly understood (even if Vietnam seemed to prove otherwise) that the ultimate goal of the insurgent was political in nature. Therefore counterinsurgent military strategies must be and were, in the Dominican Republic, ruled by political objectives.

The second principle was probably accepted by Washington because President Johnson shared former U.S. Ambassador John B. Martin's

belief that it was not in the national interest of the U.S. to be remembered for putting down the revolt in a fashion reminiscent of the USSR in Budapest. Bloodshed would have to be minimized at all costs if the U.S. was to emerge from this episode with its national honor intact and friends in the hemisphere.

The third principle recognized that if the United States was to maintain its ability to resolve the crisis it would require access to many diplomatic channels in Latin America. Flexibility in negotiations would be otherwise lost if Latin America turned its back on the U.S. because of the intervention. The United States was also aware that it would have to maintain at least a facade of legitimacy regarding the use of its troops in Santo Domingo. The humanitarian aspect of the intervention was lost after the last U.S. citizen and foreign national were evacuated. The knowledge that if U.S. troops left the rebels would gain the upper hand, forced Washington to search for other sources of legitimacy as justification for keeping the Marines and paratroopers in place. This could only be found through the provisions of the OAS and the IAPF. Therefore OAS support became critical for legitimizing the U.S. presence. The U.S. could ill afford to lose it.

The fourth and final principle acknowledged one of the reasons President Johnson believed that the Bay of Pigs Mission failed. The President and his advisors were sure that if a stronger, better equipped, and well supported force had moved rapidly from its beachhead at the Bay of Pigs it probably would have destroyed its Cuban enemy and thereby succeeded. Therefore they were certain that if U.S. troops were to be successful they had to be employed rapidly and in massive numbers in order to permanently upset rebel time tables for victory.

Conclusions

The general peace and relatively democratic governments that the Dominican Republic has experienced since the 1965 crisis demonstrates that a tightly controlled intervention in Latin America can be successful. This success can be gained even in spite of the misinformation, preconceived notions and political prejudices that initially launched the U.S. on its Caribbean adventure. However, the essential conclusions to be drawn from the lessons of the Dominican crisis are: (a) if the United States must intervene it must do so rapidly, and massively in order to prevent any side from gaining a military advantage; (b) The U.S. must maintain as neutral a stance as possible and must not act alone; (c) Washington must absolutely keep its military means subordinated to a clearly stated, attainable, and negotiated political end; (d) Rather than attempting to destroy the insurgent, intervening forces should isolate him on the ground and then include him in negotiations; (e) Time must be allowed to work against the contending parties and in the favor of the regional peacemakers.

Admittedly the U.S. did not have to deal with any serious communist threat during the Dominican crisis. Therefore, Washington was better prepared psychologically and ideologically to assume a somewhat neutral stance during the negotiations. I don't believe this approach would work when dealing with a true, Moscow oriented, ideologically inflexible communist faction. But then I would ask how many naturally occurring varieties of this species are there in Latin America and how many does U.S. inflexibility create from the democratic left. As an illustration it is important to note, regardless of how successful the eventual results of the intervention were, that Colonel Caamaño did not

fall under Castro's influence until after the Dominican Crisis had been resolved, not during or before it.

It is for this reason that it is important to remember that military victory in the streets of Santo Domingo was not the mission of the U.S. and later the IAPF. In spite of the anti-communist rhetoric, their actual objective was to stabilize the situation sufficiently in order to give U.S. and O.A.S. negotiators room to maneuver during the negotiations without alienating either side. In this way the U.S. and O.A.S. peace commissions could also work freely without being pressured by the opposing sides in the Civil War. As time ran out for the rebels trapped in their enclave, and as the U.S. pressured the junta for accommodations, the overall negotiating climate became more favorable for a settlement. After the peace settlement had been accepted, the IAPF enforced its provisions, thereby giving the provisional government time to gain strength and conduct an election.

Future Applications?

The question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from the Dominican Crisis can be applied to other parts of Latin America is debatable. Avoidance of intervention is of course preferable if the objectives of the various contending parties and the U.S. can be gained diplomatically. Perhaps if Washington and Ambassador Bennett had been better informed and had supported Molina Urena and the PRD, the same outcome could have been achieved without the use of U.S. troops. However this is merely conjecture, after the fact. Crises such as this one are always surrounded by the fog of poor information and rumors. Hence decision makers are often forced to act on instinct and judgment rather than accurate information. Yet, the facts speak for themselves in the

post-crisis Dominican Republic. President Johnson succeeded in preventing what he perceived to be the creation of another Cuba and the Dominican Republic, after five hundred years, has a stable, democratic government, now controlled after peaceful elections by the PRD.

Could these same results have been achieved in Nicaragua or perhaps even currently in El Salvador. Before making this kind of judgment the U.S. would have to demonstrate the willingness to accept three principles when an incumbent government, verging on collapse, requests help. First, the United States must be willing to demand immediate negotiations and accept the presence of rebel representatives at the negotiating table. In spite of our advances in the technical gathering of intelligence the U.S. is no closer to being able to determine if an insurgency is Cuban exported or instigated than it was in the Dominican Republic. Therefore, branding all rebels as communists is not only unfair but also dangerous to U.S. interests in the region because refusing to talk to them, due to their alleged political orientation, could result in a self-fulfilling prophecy. An insurgency that demonstrates popular support must reflect problems deeper than simply a cadre of rebels stirring up trouble. Hence they must be acknowledged at the negotiating table as they were in the Dominican Republic. Next, the U.S. must be willing to maintain a military balance during negotiations in order to prevent either side from gaining a significant military advantage that would make them less willing to negotiate. This leads to the final point, the U.S. must demonstrate a willingness to use its forces if it appears that either party is attempting to gain a battlefield advantage.

Perhaps a fourth principle should also be mentioned concerning

the O.A.S. This organization must demonstrate that it has the willingness to use its diplomatic and military assets to support a peacekeeping role in the region even if it is sponsored by the U.S. Unfortunately the regional consensus to do this which seemed to exist in the 1960's does not seem to exist now. The principle that what my neighbor does within his own borders is his own business seems to be the accepted rule. Cuba has ceased to be the threat it once was thought to be, yet the traditional distrust of the U.S. continues. Therefore any kind of a united action to set someone else's "house" in order does not seem likely.

Unless the United States and the Organization of American States currently demonstrate that they are willing to accept these principles, an action such as the Dominican Intervention would not occur much less have an opportunity to use the conclusions of 1965 and 1966 to gain a success. Nicaragua stands as a glaring testimony to this fact.

Yet, the Dominican Republic shows that the often violent forces of change in Latin America can be controlled by intervention with the relative certainty of achieving a political solution acceptable to everyone. Unfortunately it may take another Cuba or Nicaragua to learn this lesson again.

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
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